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I. INTRODUCTION
It is impossible to adequately portray today's economy without
devoting time to the Internet startups that drove the stock market's
meteoric rise in the last decade. Truly, an immense amount of
wealth was transferred during the Internet boom - the tech-heavy
Nasdaq 100 rose by 274% during 1998 - 1999, while the broader
Nasdaq Composite Index rose by more than 500% between 1995 -
1999.1 Unfortunately, between June 2000 and June 2001, an
astounding $4 trillion in wealth evaporated from those unlucky
investors who bought into what would soon be recognized as one
of the most remarkable speculative bubbles in recent memory
Indeed, the federal government has begun a broad inquiry into this
matter, because something doesn't smell quite right.'
"Cornell, B.A., Georgetown, J.D., L.L.M. I would like to dedicate this article to
my wife Enik6 Hangay, for her love, patience, and support. Additionally, I
would like to give special thanks to Vadim Daynovsky and Dwayne Mason for
their editorial input.
1. Michael E. Lewitt, New Math or New Economy? Some Ruminations on
the 1999 Stock Market Bubble, TRUSTS & ESTATES, Feb. 1, 2001, at 41.
2. See James Toedtman, Wall Street Analysts Face Probe, House Investigates
Industry Behavior, NEWSDAY, June 15, 2001, at A63 (detailing Wall Street's
allegedly improper role in creating the bubble in the first place). See generally,
Peter Elstrom, The Great Internet Money Game, Bus. WK., Apr. 16, 2001, at
EB16.
3. See Susan Pulliam & Randall Smith, SEC's IPO Inquiries Advance on
Two Fronts, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2001, at C1 (describing a continuing SEC
probe into certain investment bank practices, namely "whether [Wall] Street
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What explanation could account for such a stark reversal of
fortune for the average investor? In part, blame should be placed
upon those investment banks and financial advisors that managed
and distributed new startup securities. This Article explores the
legal aspects of the initial public offering ("IPO")' process and
explains how its mechanics played a significant role in priming the
Internet boom and its eventual implosion.
At the heart of the Internet boom was the public's insatiable
appetite for Internet-related IPOs' In August 1995, the beginning
of the Internet boom was marked by the IPO of Netscape Inc., the
leading Internet browser company at the time.6 The market
greeted Netscape's IPO with explosive enthusiasm, even though
Microsoft Corporation was seeking to distribute its rival Internet
browser for free, as part of Windows 95.7 Moreover, Netscape had
never turned a profit, having lost $13 million since its founding in
1994.8 Nonetheless, the day before the offering, the underwriters
increased the number of shares in the offering from 3.5 million to 5
million and doubled its price to $28 per share.9 Demand was so
intense that during the first hour of trading, Netscape's shares still
firms improperly tied allocations of initial public offerings of stock to promises by
customers to buy additional shares once trading began.").
4. In the securities industry Initial Public Offering refers to the first offering
of an issuer's equity securities to the public through a registration statement. See
BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY vii-x (6th ed. 1991).
5. See Elstrom, supra note 2, at EB16.
6. Press Release, Netscape Communications Corporation, Netscape
Communications Corporation Announces Initial Public Offering of 5,000,000
Shares of Common Stock (Aug. 9, 1995), available at
http://home.netscape.com/newsref/pr/newsrelease34.html (last visited Jan. 8,
2002); see also Press Release, Netscape Communications Corporation, Netscape's
First Year of Product Shipments Establishes Broad Internet Market Leadership
(Dec. 13, 1995), available at
http://home.netscapte.com/newsref/pr/newsrelease69.html (last visited Jan. 8,
2002).
7. See Molly Baker, Netscape's IPO Gets an Explosive Welcome,' WALL ST.
J., Aug. 9, 1995, at C1 (noting that already, according to Wall Street experts,
"investors have placed orders for an astounding 100 million shares.").
8. See id.
9. David B. Yoffie & Michael A. Cusumano, Building a Company on
Internet Time: Lessons from Netscape, CAL. MGMT. REv., Mar. 22, 1999, at 8, 24.
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managed to shoot up from $28 to $75, an increase of 168%.o
"After the first day of trading, Netscape [was] worth $2.2 billion."1
As testament to Netscape's phenomenal market valuation, in 1999
America Online ("AOL") purchased it for an astonishing $10
billion. 2
Hot IPOs3 were a pervasive phenomenon during the Internet
boom. In 1998 and 1999, the value of IPO shares frequently surged
400 - 500% during the first day of trading.14  To illustrate, on
November 12, 1998, shares of the now defunct TheGlobe.com, a
website founded by two Cornell University undergraduates, soared
606% during morning trading, from $9 to $48." A company with
no clear business plan, which gave out "web space" for free,
thereby attained a market valuation of $1.5 billion.' 6
During the Internet boom, parties other than the offering
company were profiting substantially from public offerings of
securities, often reaping more money than was raised during the
IPO. First-day price run-ups of the magnitude observed during the
Internet boom suggest two immediate questions. First, were
underwriters purposefully under-pricing IPO shares? Second, were
the underwriters channeling the shares to favored clients in order
10. Ted Sickinger, IPO Madness; You Can Lose Your Shirt if You Rush
Headlong into Hot, New Stocks, KAN. CITY STAR, June 16, 1996, at Fl.
11. Yoffie & Cusumano, supra note 9, at 24.
12. See id. at &
13. When there is substantial market interest in an IPO, it is said to be "hot."
Typically, a hot IPO will be priced so that it "pops," or experiences a sudden
surge, during the first day of trading. See generally, Richard A. Booth, Discounts
and other Mysteries of Corporate Finance, 79 CAL. L. REv. 1055, 1093 (1991).
Netscape's IPO was one such "hot" IPO.
14. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The IPO Allocation Probe: Who Is the Victim?,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 18, 2001, at 5.
15. See Michael McCormack, World Comes Crashing Down on Pioneering
US Dot.com; Spectacular Debut Ends in Disaster for TheGlobe, HERALD, Aug. 8,
2001, at 20.
16. Id. At one point, stocks for the company reached a price of $97, giving
the company a market valuation of $2.9 billion. See Erin Ferrell, The Sun Sets on
TheGlobe.com, DAILY DEAL, Aug. 3, 2001. Another example involves VA
Linux Systems, a distributor of computer operating systems software - its shares
shot up to just a shade under 700% over its initial offering price in December of
1999. See Coffee, The IPO Allocation Probe: Who is the Victim?, supra note 14,
at 5.
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to preserve goodwill and profit from a continued business
relationship?
Resolution of the latter question is particularly significant
given how Wall Street makes its money. Investment bankers have
earned $2.1 billion in underwriting fees from Internet-related
issues since 1997." That figure, although significant, pales in
comparison to the amount that the industry earns in trading fees,
which accounted for an estimated forty percent of Wall Street's
profits during 2000.18
Trading is undoubtedly a high-margin business that investment
banks have zealously sought to preserve." Investment bankers
charge mutual funds about five cents per share traded, three cents
of which represents pure profit to the bank.' By contrast,
electronic communications networks such as Instinet and
Archipelago can presently execute the same trades at less than a
penny per stock.' Despite this new technology, "from 1998 to
1999, [investment bank] revenues from spreads and commissions
climbed from $44 billion to $66 billion - a 50% jump."'
Investment banks can exploit their underwriting activities to
increase those all-important trading revenues; this is done by
"creating a market" in the stock offered during an IPO. As a
practical matter, an investment bank will have a near-monopoly in
aftermarket trades for the first few weeks following an IPO, a
period during which the stock has not yet been disseminated
widely enough to allow other banks to freely offer it to their
customers.' This ephemeral period allows the investment bank to
17. See Elstrom, supra note 2, at EB16.
18. Shawn Tully, Betrayal on Wall Street: The Credibility Gap Between
Investment Banks and Their Clients Has Never Been Wider. Why? Just Look at
the IPO Con Game, FORTUNE, May 14, 2001, at 84.
19. See id.
20. See Tully, Betrayal on Wall Street, supra note 18 ("Institutions can now
trade at less than a penny a share on ECNs.").
21. See id.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 86 (pointing out that, "[a]s a rule, the lead underwriter on each
deal gets a near-monopoly on trading for the first week or two, because the
grateful funds sell their shares back to Merrill, Lehman, or whoever managed the
offering.").
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make large profits on the purchases and sales of that stock - it can
generate "fat" spreads that significantly boost up trading
revenues.7
However, IPOs may serve to increase trading profits in a more
insidious way. During 1999 - 2000, all underwriting activities
combined brought Wall Street $7.3 billion in revenues.' Notably,
during the same period Wall Street's favorite clients (i.e., those
capable of trading large blocks of stock and thereby generating
sizeable commissions) reaped $66 billion in instant profits from
IPO under-pricing. Did investment bankers use IPO allocations
as commercial bribes to mutual funds and other institutional
investors in order to maintain or enhance lucrative trading
revenues?
Because hot IPOs provided access to practically "guaranteed
profit[s]," during the Internet boom they became a "kind of
currency readily used by brokers, underwriters, and issuers to
reward good customers."' Investment bankers, with the complicity
of mutual funds and other institutional investors, used their access
to hot IPOs to bolster other profitable aspects of their business.'
Meanwhile, issuers were left holding the bag. One prominent
securities lawyer asked, "[hias our system for capital raising for
young companies become dysfunctional when as much as 75
percent of the market value of the stock sold in the IPO, as of the
end of the first trading day, goes to two classes of financial
intermediaries - namely, underwriters and institutional
24. See id. ("[B]y generating those fat spreads buying and selling new IPO
shares, firms match or exceed the underwriting fees in trading profits.").
25. See Testimony on Financial Market Analysis Accuracy Before the House
Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance
and Government-Sponsored Enterprises, FDCH CONG. TESTIMONY. (June 14,
2001) (statement by David W. Tice, Portfolio Manager).
26. See id.
27. Phillip L. Zweig & Leah Nathans Spiro, Beware the IPO Market
Individual Investors Are at a Big Disadvantage, Bus. WK., Apr. 4, 1994, at 84; see
also John C. Coffee, Jr., 'Spinning' for Dollars: IPOs and Allocation of Hot
Issues, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 26, 1998, at 5.
28. See Zweig & Spiro, supra note 27; see also Michael Siconolfi, Venture
Capitalists Get Stern Warning on 'Spinning' IPOs, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1997, at
C16.
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investors?"'29
Issuers were not the only victims of the hot IPO phenomenon
during the Internet boom. Small investors bore the brunt of the
losses suffered in the aftermath of the collapse of the market for
Internet stocks, as they could not compete on a level playing field
with mutual funds and other institutional investors. Those
institutional investors that did not immediately cash in on hot
Internet IPOs gradually thinned their Internet holdings before the
market imploded?' But small investors, instead of "flipping"31
Internet stocks for a quick gain, held on to them, expecting a long-
term gain that would never materialize. The result was disastrous,
and the aftermath continues to exact its toll.32
The magnitude of the losses that small or so-called "retail"
investors suffered during the Internet boom is a politically
explosive issue for the securities industry, and may cause
fundamental changes in the way the industry does business."
Congressional hearings have been held to narrowly examine the
29. Coffee, The IPO Allocation Probe: Who Is the Victim?, supra note 14, at
5.
30. See Noelle Knox et al., Officials Suspect Manipulation; Agencies
Scrutinize Some Investment Banks' Activities, USA TODAY, May 25, 2001, at lB.
In contrast, by May 2001, "individual investors owned as much as 75% of the
shares in Internet companies, compared with about 44% of the shares in General
Motors." Id.
31. Flipping is the practice of buying hot IPO shares at the offering price and
quickly reselling them in the aftermarket, thus reaping an immediate profit when
IPO shares climb in value right after their initial release. See, e.g., Jonathan A.
Shayne & Larry D. Soderquist, Inefficiency in the Market for Initial Public
Offerings, 48 VAND. L. REv. 965, 976 (1995).
32. "Of the 367 Internet outfits taken public since 1997 that... [were still
trading by April 2001], 316 [were trading] below their offering prices." Elstrom,
supra note 2, at EB16. Indeed, by June 2001, only 27% of websites were
profitable. See Katherine Hobson, Bucking the E-Biz Trend, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., June 4, 2001, at 36. Currently, most online retailers continue to
lose money, at an average of 13% of sales. Id.
33. See Shawn Tully, Is Wall Street Serious About Reform?; Slammed by the
Public, the Press, and Now Even Congress, the Big Investment Firms Have
Promised to Change the Way They do Business; Their Lobbying Efforts Tell a
Different Story, FORTUNE, July 9, 2001, at 90 ("[I]f Congress and the SEC hang
tough, they could encourage a new breed of analysts proffering unbiased
research.").
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role of analysts, who would whip up the buying frenzy needed to
create hot IPOs, with the use of "folksy" and completely unrealistic
forecasts?' The media has also been unsparing in its criticism of
the industry.35
In 1997, Chairman of the National Venture Capital
Association, Carl Thoma, warned the Association's members
against abusing the IPO process for private gain. He stated,
"[t]imes are good. Let's not all get greedy, and remember that an
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure."36 The advice was
farsighted. Now that the Internet boom has turned sour, aggrieved
investors are turning with anger to the financial firms that churned
the Internet frenzy, and "lawsuits are piling up faster than dead
dotcoms."37
Presently, at least three government agencies are involved in
determining the complicated money flow, and whether any laws
were broken.38 The Attorney General for the State of New York,
for example, is investigating brokerage firms' research and stock
recommendation policies to public customers.39 The Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") and the National Association of
Securities Dealers ("NASD") are investigating the liability of
venture capitalists, institutional investors and other big Wall Street
players that "flipped" hot IPOs for risk-free profits. ' The SEC is
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. Siconolfi, supra note 28, at C16.
37. Daniel Kadlec, Wall Street's New Honor Code; Analysts Got Rich
Promoting Bubble Stocks and IPOs; Now They Say They'll Come Clean; Whom
Are They Kidding?, TIME, June 25, 2001, at 73; see also Daniel Kadlec, Investigate
The Investors; Congress and the Courts Are Probing Analysts' Conflicts, but
Investors' Bubble Behavior Was Loathsome Too, TIME, Aug. 13, 2001, at 68;
Matthew Lynn, Come the Retribution, SUNDAY Bus., Aug. 12, 2001, at 19. See,
e.g., In re Initial Public Offering Antitrust Litig., No. 01 Civ. 2014 (S.D.N.Y. filed
Jan. 2, 2002) (providing an example of a recent class action complaint filed
against underwriters of IPOs during the Internet boom).
3K See Kadlec, supra note 37, at 73.
39. See Joshua Chaffin & Andrew Hill, Wall St Code Splits Analysts from
Bankers, FIN. TIMES (London), June 13, 2001, at 28.
40. See Siconolfi, supra note 28, at C16; see also Jim Evans, The Private
World of Public Offerings, INDUST. STANDARD, May 2, 2001. Jim Evans
describes the context of the SEC investigations in this manner-
2001]
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especially interested in Wall Street's methods of IPO share
allocation during the particularly bullish 1999 - 2000 period.41
This Article investigates the legal issues surrounding the
securities industry's behavior during the Internet boom.
Understanding exactly how IPOs are put together is key to the
legal analysis, and accordingly, Part I will provide an overview of
the underwriting process and market mechanisms that allow
underwriters to pull IPOs virtually out of thin air.
The role of analysts in triggering the speculative frenzy that
led to the Internet boom has been the subject of intense debate.
Part II will examine the conflicts of interest affecting analysts who
work for investment banks that actively underwrite new issues. In
particular, this Article will examine how investment banks can
exploit their analysts' ability to move the market in order to
generate hot IPOs. The Article will also pay particularly close
attention to Regulation FD, which was passed with the intention of
breaking the "chummy" relationship between analysts and
corporate insiders that characterized the late 1990's.
Part III of the Article will examine the NASD rules governing
the allocation of hot IPOs. The currently applicable Free-Riding
and Withholding Interpretation will be discussed, as well as
proposed Rule 2790, which will supersede the Free-Riding and
Withholding Interpretation once the NASD adopts it. The Article
will then examine institutional investors' alleged use of kickbacks
in the form of increased trading volume or trading commissions to
induce underwriters to facilitate access to hot IPOs. The Article
will discuss several legal theories that could be used to criminalize
such behavior.
In Part IV, the Article will turn to the legal standards that
Imagine you are a banker taking technology companies public in 1999, the
height of the IPO craze.
You make millions of dollars for yourself and your firm. But what if you could
find a way to make even more millions by tapping into the seemingly endless
demand for hot new technology IPOs? Say you offered fund managers an extra
helping of those highly desirable IPO shares. The catch, well, they'd just have
to pay a little extra on subsequent trades. Very tempting. And quite illegal.
But that's exactly the scenario at the heart of a federal government probe into
large investment bank's allotment practices.
Id.
41. See Chaffin & Hill, supra note 39, at 28.
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prevent mutual fund managers and other investment advisers from
pocketing hot IPOs. Specifically, the SEC's approach to the
Monetta Financial Services2 precedent will be highlighted.
This Article argues that the current legal and regulatory
infrastructure is insufficient to address the hot IPO phenomenon,
and proposes certain reforms to prevent its recurrence. In
particular, analysts should be required to indicate any bias or
conflict of interest to potential investors. Most importantly, the
NASD or SEC should eliminate favoritism in the IPO allocation
process by mandating the use of equitable mechanisms to conduct
distributions.
II. HOT IPOS AND THE UNDERWRITING PROCESS
The IPO process involves five distinct steps.'3 An issuer of
stock must generally coordinate efforts with one or more
underwriters." Therefore, the first step of the IPO process involves
selecting an underwriter or underwriting team and negotiating an
underwriting agreement, which usually takes between one and two
months. 5
Second, a prospectus must be drafted and the offering must be
registered with the SEC. This process usually takes two or three
months."
Next, the underwriter stages a "road show" to introduce the
issuer's product and its management team to institutional and
other qualified investors who may be interested in purchasing large
blocks of shares. Road shows usually last two to four weeks,
42. See infra notes 512-519 and accompanying text.
43. See Michael Hovarth, An Insider Guide to Going Public; The Number of
Companies Going Public Has Reached Record Levels; Michael Hovarth Explains
the Process Behind an IPO, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 20, 2000, at 6.
44. See Brian C. Eddy, Internet Road Shows: It's Time to Open the Door for
the Retail Investor, 25 IOWA J. CORP. L. 867 (2000).
45. See Hovarth, supra note 43, at 6.
46. See id.
47. See Roberta Silverstein, IPOs Are Plentiful, But Launch Is No Piece of
Cake, Bus. J., Jan. 14, 2000, at 20 (discussing the road show and other
requirements for going public, including the type and amount of expenses
involved); see also Gerard R. Boyce, Preparing for the Initial Public Offering,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 9, 1999, at 5; Jaikaran Singh, Watch Your Mouth: Section 12(a) (2)
20011
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although more time may be required if the underwriter wants to
generate interest in the offering from investors located abroad."8
Once the SEC authorizes the offering, the underwriter
determines a final price for the offering. This price is based on
prior negotiations with the issuer and the success of the road
show."9 Trading usually begins within twenty-four hours of price
determination."
The final phase of an offering involves the "lock-up period,"
which usually lasts 180 days." During the lock-up period, certain
investors are prohibited from selling their stock in the open market
in order to prevent a potential run on the stock and a
destabilization of its price. 2
Commentators have described the IPO frenzy of the Internet
boom as a con game and a virtual "license to print money." Many
investment bankers and their institutional clients got rich, while
issuers companies and individual investors got the short end of the
stick. A basic knowledge of the underwriting process and its
regulatory framework is important to understanding how IPOs
may have been abused by the investment banking industry.
Accordingly, the next section will discuss in greater detail the five
steps of the IPO process.
A. Selecting the Underwriting Team
Preparing an IPO for public distribution requires substantial
planning. Issues regarding executive compensation, corporate
Liability for Oral Statements Made at Road Shows, 23 IOWA J. CORP. L. 541, 548-
49.
48. Hovarth, supra note 43, at 6.
49. See id. ("It is imperative that managers have at least preliminary
valuation discussions with the underwriters vying to do their IPO, because
choosing an underwriter with a strong difference of opinion on the company's
valuation could spell disaster.").
50. See id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Tully, Betrayal on Wall Street, supra note 18 (detailing how most
issuers received less from their IPO than they should have, objectively); see also
Noelle Knox et al., supra note 30 (discussing a lawsuit alleging that average
investors were conned by big investment banks).
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structure and organization, as well as corporate charter and bylaws
must be addressed.' When coordinating the IPO, the underwriter,
its legal counsel and experienced auditors and accountants should
work side by side with the issuer's management.5
Typically, issuers prefer to hire prestigious investment banks
with solid connections to institutional investors, a good
understanding of the issuer's business, and which will continue to
track the issuer and maintain a market interest in the stock
following the IPO 6 Investment bankers normally receive a
percentage of the funds that the issuer raises through the IPO 7 In
fact, under the cartel-like price structure that prevailed among the
half-dozen or so market players that dominated investment
banking during the Internet boom, the usual fee was a flat, non-
negotiable seven percent underwriter's discount." That is
substantially more than the 3.4% charged by Japanese banks at the
time, and 5% charged by European banks. 9  Accordingly,
investment bankers earned approximately $8 billion in fees, out of
54. See Boyce, supra note 47, at 5.
55. See id.
56. See Debora Vrana, Bitter Lessons for Wall St.'s 'Orphans'; More
Companies Are Rushing to Cash in by Going Public, but Buoyed by Bullish Spirit,
Many Find It's Easy to Move too Fast and Find Themselves Abandoned by a
Fickle Market, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1997, at 1 (quoting a survey finding that a
majority of 200 technology companies that went public in 1996 were mainly
concerned with "finding long-term investors and investment bankers who would
support them following the IPO."); see also Jenny C. McCune, Job One: Find
Money: The Best Sources and Strategies, SUCCESS, Dec. 1994. One commentator
advises,
When selecting an underwriter, general counsel should consider, among other
things, the underwriter's reputation for generating investor interest in a
company's stock and for providing other services after the initial public
offering. In this regard, consider the underwriter's distribution capability, the
terms upon which the underwriter would do the offering, its industry
specialization, their mix of retail and institutional customers, and post-offering
support.
Steven Keith Platt, General Counsel Has a Role in Public Offerings, CORP.
LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 1993, at 30.
57. See Hovarth, supra note 43, at 6.
58. Tully, supra note 18, Betrayal on Wall Street.
59. Id. ("[Slince Wall Street is a clubby enclave dominated by a half a dozen
players that regularly participate in one another's deals, it's hard for low-cost
gatecrashers [investment firms charging less than 7%] to break through.").
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the $121 billion raised through IPOs during the Internet boom.'
Once an issuer has selected an underwriter, it must begin to
draft and negotiate an underwriting agreement.61 There are two
basic types of underwriting agreements: firm commitments and
"best efforts." A "firm commitment" offering legally binds the
investment banker to purchase the shares from the issuer prior to
distribution to the investing public.62  The second type of
underwriting agreement is the "best efforts" underwriting, which
may entail several possible variations.63 Because the underwriter
does not have to insure issue proceeds against uncertainties in
market demand, and because the underwriter does not have to
engage in pre-selling activities, best efforts underwriting generally
calls for lower commissions.' Usually, investment banks refuse to
distribute the more speculative type of securities except on a best
efforts basis.' Empirically, under-pricing has been more prevalent
with best efforts underwriting, than with firm commitment
underwriting. This difference may be partly due to a disparity in
the underwriter's and issuer's perceptions of firm value."
Underwriters usually bargain for an "overallotment" or "green
shoe" option, which specifies a number of shares, typically 10 -
15% of the IPO offering, that they may purchase at their discretion
from the issuer for thirty to forty-five days after the IPO.67
Overallotment shares allow underwriters to meet excess demand
60. Id.
61. See Platt, supra note 56, at 30.
62. See Hovarth, supra note 43, at 6 (stating that the "firm commitment,"
while more costly, is more favorable to the company, as the responsibility for the
IPO shifts to the underwriter - it is now obligated to purchase all of the offered
securities and then resell them.).
63. See Boyce, supra note 47, at 5.
64. See Lena Chua, A Reexamination of the Costs of Firm Commitment and
Best Efforts IPOs, FIN. REv., May 1995, at 337 (stating that Benveniste & Spindt
"imply that underwriter compensation is lower because underwriters do not
engage in pre-selling activities," while Mandelker & Raviv claim underwriter
compensation is lower because "investment bankers do not insure issue proceeds
against uncertainty in the demand for the shares.").
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See Hovarth, supra note 43, at 6.
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and satisfy requirements from institutional clients." Although an
overallotment allows issuers to raise extra capital from a given
offering, it really benefits the underwriter and its institutional
clients when the IPO is hot.69 Indeed, the underwriter will typically
only pay the issuer for the stock at the underwriter's standard
discount rate, and not at the stock's inflated aftermarket value."
Nevertheless, an overallotment may be important for price
stabilization purposes.7 An overallotment allows the underwriter
to serve as the chief market maker in the stock and thereby
maintains an orderly market.72
B. Registering with the SEC
After the underwriting team has been selected, the second step
in the underwriting process involves preparing a registration
statement for the SEC.73 This requires the submission of all
relevant paperwork.74
68. See id. (explaining how overallotment creates incentives for institutional
clients to return for more IPOs).
69. See id. (stating that overallotment may also hurt companies because
selling more stock at the underwriter's discount after the stock rises considerably
on the first day is detrimental to the company).
70. See id. (stating that companies may be hurt by selling shares at the
discounted underwriter price).
71. See id.
72. See id. (noting that the underwriter's role as the chief market maker for
the stock through overallotment is "crucial in maintaining price stability.").
73. See id.
74. In the case of an initial public offering, the relevant document will
probably be an S-1 Form, or the "default" registration statement to be used by
any issuer "for which no other form is authorized or prescribed." See Forms for
Registration Statements, 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (2001); see also
http://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/forms.htm (last visited June 27, 2001). Form S-1
mandates rigorous disclosure concerning nearly all aspects of the issuer's business
that could be of potential interest to an investor. (Sample S-1 Forms, as well all
other securities registration forms, may be downloaded from the SEC's website
at http://www.sec.gov. In particular, Form S-1 is available at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/forms/s-l.htm (last visited June 27, 2001)).
Form S-1 requires complete and extensive disclosure regarding the offering (e.g.,
plan of distribution, use of proceeds, etc.), as well as the issuer's overall business,
properties, and management arrangements, and prospects. Detailed audited
2001]
34 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VII
FINANCIAL LAW
Registering an offering can be extremely expensive and time
consuming." For example, the average total cost of conducting an
IPO during 1994 - 1999 was eight percent of the amount raised by
the offering.76 Due to the legal and regulatory complexities
involved,' issuers typically rely on their underwriters, as well as
experienced securities lawyers and certified public accountants, to
assist them in registering IPOs with the SEC, NASD Regulation,
Inc.,' and state securities regulators.7" Accordingly, a relatively
small $25 million IPO requires an estimated average cost of $2.35
million, including $1.75 million in underwriting fees, $200,000 in
legal fees and $160,000 in accounting fees and expenses. 9
As discussed below, analysts working for the investment bank
sponsoring the underwriting play a key role in preparing securities
registration statements. Frequently, the investment bank will rely
on its analysts' expertise and familiarity with the issuer for due
diligence and to ensure the accuracy of the registration statement's
information.' However, the participation of analysts in
financial statements for at least three fiscal years must be included. See Richard
J. Hillman, Small Business - Efforts to Facilitate Equity Capital Formation, GAO
REP., Sept. 29, 2000, at 26, available at www.gao.gov. Additionally, Form S-1
specifies the information that must be set forth in the prospectus. See JAMES D.
COX, ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 45 (2d ed. 1997).
Finally, no incorporation by reference is allowed. Presumably, intentional
underpricing would need to be disclosed. The S-1 Form indicates how many
shares are going to be included in the offering, and describes a price range for
each share. However, the registration statement will not contain a final price. See
generally, Hovarth, supra note 43, at 6. That price is only determined after the
underwriter and the issuer have taken the offering "on the road." Id.
75. See Hillman, supra note 74, at 23-24.
76. See id.
77. NASD Regulation, Inc. is the independent subsidiary of the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), Inc., and is authorized to regulate the
securities industry and the NASDAQ Stock Market. See
http://www.nasdr.com/2200.htm (last visited June 27, 2001) (stating that the
NASD was created in 1938 by the Maloney Act amendments to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934); see also Maloney Over-the-Counter Market Act, Pub. L.
No. 75-719, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o, 78o-3,
78cc, 78ff, 78q (2000)).
78. See Hillman, supra note 74, at 23.
79. Id.
80. See Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Underwriter Due Diligence In
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underwriting transactions raises troublesome independence
concerns and a potential for bias in the analysts' research reports.8
Moreover, analyst access to the issuer's confidential information
may expose analysts and their employers to liability for insider
trading.'
C. The Road Show
1. A Forum to "Test the Waters" of Market Interest
Underwriters do not take issuers public unless there is
sufficient market interest." If there is insufficient interest in a
particular offering, it may be scaled down or discarded altogether.'
Therefore, the underwriter must first evaluate the market interest
in each offering. 5 The underwriter "ideally has contacts among
institutional money managers who might be interested in
purchasing the [issuers] shares" whom it will survey and ascertain
what quantities of the offering they desire.' Thus, the investment
banker will usually have a good indication beforehand whether an
IPO will be "hot."87
As mentioned earlier, to generate interest in a particular
offering and to evaluate market demand, investment bankers
typically sponsor a "road show" that introduces the offering to
potential major purchasers.' During the road show, institutional
investors, security analysts and broker dealers meet the issuer's
Securities Offerings, N.Y.L.J., May 27, 1999, at 5 (analyzing the problems which
may arise if underwriters fail to maintain a "Chinese Wall" between their
analysts and their brokers).
81. See id.
82- See id.
83. See Hovarth, supra note 43, at 6.
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. See Frederick D. Lipman, The Best Way to Launch an Initial Public
Offering, NAT. L. J., Apr. 17, 1995, at C25.
88. See Samuel N. Allen, A Lawyer's Guide to the Operation of Underwriting
Syndicates, 26 NEw ENGL L. REV. 319, 340-41 (1991) (explaining the road show
forum and format).
2001]
36 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VII
FINANCIAL LAW
management team and learn about the issuer.a9 The issuer's CEO,
CFO and other senior management members usually make brief
speeches and presentations discussing the issuer's business strategy
and financial outlook.' Road shows frequently feature live shows,
videotapes, and other multimedia materials, as well as oral
statements not found in the written prospectus.91 Generally, group
presentations are supplemented with one-on-one meetings
between the issuer and those institutions interested in purchasing
large blocks of stock.92 However, the only written material
distributed to attendees is the preliminary prospectus contained in
the registration statement.93
2. Statutory Requirements
Road shows are subject to strict legal requirements." The SEC
has indicated that an issuer may "test the waters" to determine
market interest prior to an offering.95 However, there cannot be
any solicitation or acceptance of money until the SEC has
completed its review of the registration statement and authorized
its issuance.96 To appreciate the ability of underwriters to generate
hot IPOs, it is important to understand the legal framework they
must negotiate before their road show information can be fully
exploited.
The Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") significantly
restricts the ability of issuers to generate publicity about securities
offerings.' Section 5 of the Securities Act divides the public
89. See Hovarth, supra note 43, at 6.
90. See Allen, supra note 88, at 340.
91. See id. at 341.
92. See Eddy, supra note 44, at 870.
93. See id.
94. See generally, The Regulation of Securities Offerings, Securities Act
Release No. 33-7606A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 202, 210, 228, 229, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249
(2001).
95. See Solicitations of Interest Prior to an Initial Public Offering, Securities
Act Release No. 33,7188, 60 F.R. 35648 (July 10, 1995).
96. See Allen, supra note 88, at 338-39; see also Edward C. Hannah & John J.
Goodyear, Securities Act Issues for New Technology Companies - Davies, Ward &
Beck, MONDAo Bus. BRIEFING, Apr. 26, 1999 (quoting Rule 254).
97. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(a)-(z)(3) (2000).
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offering process into three stages, each with distinct legal
consequences: (1) the pre-filing period, (2) the waiting period, and
(3) the post-effective period.98 The pre-filing period, describes the
stage during which a registration statement has yet to be filed with
respect to the security being offered.99 During the waiting period, a
registration statement has been filed, but has not yet been
approved by the SEC."°° When the SEC finalizes the registration
statement and declares it to be in effect, the securities offering is
said to have entered the post-effective period. 1'
During the pre-filing period, no sales activity of any kind may
take place.l" Section 5(c) of the Securities Act prohibits any
person from making oral or written offers to sell any security
unless a registration statement has been filed with the SEC with
respect to that security.
Although virtually no advertising is permitted during the
waiting period, potential investors may be introduced to the
offering through the statutorily defined "prospectus." All
solicitations of offers to buy the registered securities can be made
only by prospectus."l However, no transaction to purchase
securities may yet be concluded - sales are only permitted during
the post-effective period, whether originated from oral or written
offers to sell."°5
Unless an exception applies, Section 5(a) prohibits any person
from selling a security in interstate commerce unless the SEC
98. See Peter D. Santori, Selling Investment Company Shares Via an Off-the-
Page Prospectus: "Leveling the Playing Field" or "Diminishing Investor
Protection," 20 IOWA J. CORP. L. 245, 249-50 (1995) (describing the actions
permitted by the regulations at each stage in the process).
99. See id. at 249.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. Aleta G. Estreicher, Securities Regulation and the First Amendment, 24
GA. L. REv. 223, 278 (1990).
103. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2000), otherwise known as Section 5(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933.
104. Estreicher, supra note 102, at 279 ("From the filing of the registration
statement until the effective date - the so-called 'waiting period' - virtually no
advertising is permitted except through distribution of the statutorily defined
'prospectus'.").
105. See id. at 280-81.
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declares that the registration statement is in effect.'" In other
words, sales may not be finalized until the post-effective period.
Road shows are typically conducted during the waiting
period." Except for the preliminary prospectus, road shows
involve nothing more than oral and visual communications."° Oral
offers to sell, whether in person or by telephone or other electronic
means, are unrestricted during the waiting period.'" However, no
offer, whether oral or in writing, may be accepted until the SEC
has declared the registration statement to be in effect."'
Accordingly, issuers are barred from selling any securities offered
during a road show."' Traders for both the institutional investor
and the underwriter must therefore carefully couch their
negotiating language so that they do not include any promises or
specific numbers."'
Not surprisingly, "prospectus" is a term of art that is broadly
defined. Section 2(a)(10) of the Securities Act defines a
"prospectus" as "any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement,
letter, or communication, written or by radio or television, which
offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of any security,"
and sets out the exceptions to that definition."' According to
106. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (2000), otherwise known as Section 5(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933.
107. See Eddy, supra note 44, at 872.
108. Id. at 873.
109. See id. at 872.
110. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2000).
111. See Eddy, supra note 44, at 874.
112. See Carol Vinzant, Public Offering, Private Deal; Probes, Lawsuits Shed
Light on Secret World of Wall Street's Once-Hot IPO Market, WASH. POST, June
17, 2001, at HO. Moreover, any offer tendered during a road show must
conform to strict statutory requirements to ensure that it is not treated as a
written offer under the law. In pertinent part, Section 5(b)(1) provides that, "[it
shall be unlawful for any person.., to carry or transmit [in interstate commerce]
any prospectus relating to any security with respect to which a registration
statement has been filed... unless such prospectus meets the requirements of
Section [101." 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (2000) (otherwise known as Section 5(b) of the
Securities Act of 1933).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(10) (2000). A communication that would otherwise be
a prospectus is not so deemed "if it states from whom a written prospectus
meeting the requirements of Section [10] ... may be obtained and, in addition,
does no more than identify the security, state the price thereof, state by whom
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Section 10(a), a prospectus "shall contain the information
contained in the registration statement. ' .. Therefore, any offer to
sell a security during the waiting period must be accompanied by a
statutory prospectus. Oral and visual communications during a
road show do not fall under the definition of a prospectus under
Section 2(a)(10), which only applies to written material. 5
Accordingly, road shows properly conducted during the waiting
period do not violate Section 5(b)(1) of the Securities Act nor any
other statutory proscription."6
As a practical matter, at the time of the filing of the
registration statement, parties to a syndication agreement may
leave certain specific terms unfinalized."7 For example, the price of
the offered securities, discounts and commissions to underwriters
and dealers, and other information about the underwriting
syndicate are often disclosed only on the eve of the effective date
of the registration statement."8 Section 10(b) allows such omission,
orders will be executed, and contains such other information as the
Commission ... may permit." Id.
Pursuant to Section 2(a)(10), the SEC promulgated Rule 134, entitled
"Communications Not Deemed a Prospectus," which allows the issuer to release,
during the waiting and post-effective periods, communications intended to serve
not as selling documents, but as a means to assess market interest in the
prospective securities offering. See 17 C.F.R. §230.134 (2001). Rule 134
prescribes the information that a so-called "tombstone ad" or "identifying
statement" may contain. See id. Without constituting a prospectus, such
communications may contain, the full name of the issuer, the type of security
offered, the price or price range of the security, the names of the managing
underwriters, and the date that the proposed sale will commence, or any of eight
other specified items. See id. Circulars, notices, press releases or any other type
of communication whether written or transmitted by radio or television can meet
the requirements of Rule 134. See id. A tombstone ad must identify a person
from whom a Section 10 prospectus may be obtained. See id.
114. 15 U.S.C. § 77j(a)(1) (2000).
115. See Eddy, supra note 44, at 873 (stating that "[b]ecause traditional road
shows are nothing more than oral and visual communication, and not written
communication, they are not themselves deemed to be prospectuses under
[S]ection 2(a)(10).").
116. See id. at 872.
117. See LARRY D. SODERQUIST, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAW 54
(3rd ed. 1993).
118. See id.
2001]
40 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VII
FINANCIAL LAW
stating that the SEC "shall... permit the use of a prospectus for
the purposes of [Section 5(b)(1)], which omits in part or
summarizes information in the prospectus specified in subsection
(a) .... "
Accordingly, Rule 430 of the Securities Act provides that
during the waiting period written offers may be made by way of a
"red herring" or preliminary prospectus.Y Under Rule 430, a
prospectus will satisfy the requirements of Section 10 of the
Securities Act for purposes of Section 5(b)(1) provided that it
"contains substantially the information required by the Act and the
rules and regulations thereunder .... ,, In particular, a
preliminary prospectus may omit information regarding "offering
price, underwriting discounts or commissions, discounts or
commissions to dealers, amount of proceeds, conversion rates, call
prices, or other matters dependent upon the offering price.' 22 The
investment banker's temporal flexibility in setting the offering's
final price, namely the ability to wait until the eve of the
registration statement's effectiveness, is central to the hot IPO
phenomenon.
3. Retail Investors Are Typically Excluded
During the road show, the issuer communicates important
market information about its business prospects to a narrow, select
audience."z According to one commentator, the public is "about as
likely to find out what goes on at road shows as it is to find out
what's been happening inside the Oval Office."'2 " Indeed, it is the
law that mandates this inequitable two-tier system of disseminating
119. See 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b) (2000).
120. See Prospectus for Use Prior to Effective Date, 17 C.F.R. § 230.430
(2001).
121. Id.
122 Id.
123. See Susan Antilla, Wall Street Takes Road Shows Online, PLAIN DEALER,
Feb. 23, 1998, at 3D ("Electronic road shows do little to correct one inequity in
the way information is disseminated about new underwritings.").
124. Lawrence A. Cunningham, securities law professor at the Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law, quoted id.
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information about new offerings to the market."n
Road shows commonly include securities offerings that are
exempt from registration under a safe harbor provision, such as
Regulation D or Rule 144A. 6 To benefit from a "safe harbor"
exemption, issuers and promoters must satisfy strict regulatory
requirements." Both Regulation D, applicable to private
placements, and Rule 144A, applicable to institutional investors,
require that underwriters pre-clear audience participants as
"accredited investors" at road shows where restricted securities are
being offered.'"
Regulatory standards are strictly applied. For example, Rule
144A provides a safe harbor exemption from the Securities Act
registration requirements.9  Broker-dealers who want to
participate in a Rule 144A offering, whether purchasing for their
own accounts or otherwise, must own at least $100 million in
securities."i Attendance at a road show by investors that do not
meet these characteristics is a violation of Section 5 of the
125. See generally, Satu S. Svahn, Greater Investor Outreach at the Click of a
Mouse: Internet and Closed-Circuit Roadshows Should Reach Retail Investors, 65
BROOK. L. REv. 249 (1999) (advocating the SEC's proposed "aircraft carrier"
rule which would allow retail investors to get access to road shows).
126. 17 C.F.R. § 230.508 (2001); 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2001); see also Schulte
Roth & Zabel LLP, IPO Road Shows in the Electronic Age: SEC No-Action
Letters Addressing Use of the Internet and Closed Circuit Systems, MONDAQ. Bus.
BRIEFING, June 2, 1999 (discussing five road shows offered over the Internet or
closed circuit TV, one of which was exempt from registration under 144A).
127. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.508 (2001); 17 C.F.R. § 230-144A (2001); see also
Roberta S. Karmel, Is §5 an Anachronism?, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 21, 1995, at 3
(detailing the requirements that issuers and promoters must meet to fall under
safe harbor exemptions).
128. See Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL
1038050 (Nov. 15, 1999); Activate.net Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL
739423 (June 3, 1999); Net Roadshow, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL
40252 (Jan. 30, 1998); Bloomberg L.P., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 739085
(Oct. 22, 1997); Net Roadshow, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 555935
(July 30, 1997).
129. The exemption is for specified sales of restricted securities to qualified
institutional buyers ("QIBs"), namely institutions that in the aggregate own and
invest on a discretionary basis at least $100 million in securities. See 17 C.F.R. §
230.144A (2001).
130. Id.
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Securities Act.' Sellers are held to the "reasonable belief"
standard with respect to the status of a buyer during a Rule 144A
offering.'
Even when a road show does not involve restricted securities,
retail investors are typically excluded.'33 By excluding retail
investors, underwriters may seek to protect themselves against
liability for innocent or unintentional misrepresentations. Oral
statements made at road shows are subject to the antifraud
provisions of the securities laws.'34 For example, Section 12(a)(2)
of the Securities Act provides that a civil action may be brought
against any person who offers or sells securities "by means of
prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue
statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. '5 35
Irrespective of the underwriters' interest in excluding retail
investors from road shows, such exclusion is inconsistent with the
131. Id.
13Z See Karmel, supra note 127, at 3.
133. See Terzah Ewing, The Road Now Taken: Exclusive Shows Touting New
Issues Arrive on the Web, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 1999, at C1 (stating that small
investors "aren't invited... [to those] exclusive institutional investor meetings.").
134. Public offerings of securities and all underwriting activities must generally
comply with the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and the Investment Company Act of 1940. 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z-3 (2000); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000); 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1-
80b-21 (2000); 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-80a-64 (2000).
135. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2000) (emphasis added), otherwise known as Section
12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933. Other potential causes of action involve
Section 11 of the Securities Act and Rule lOb-5, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000); Section
11 generally holds those individuals who signed the underwriting statement liable
for any misstatements contained therein on which an investor relies when
purchasing a security. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000). Section 11 does not apply to oral
misstatements, and requires that plaintiff show reliance on defendant's
misstatements. See id. Rule 10b-5 is a general anti-fraud provision promulgated
under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act that provides investors with an implied
cause of action over the use of "manipulative and deceptive devices" in the
securities market. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001). Although it applies to oral
misstatements, it requires plaintiff to show both reliance and scienter. See Singh,
supra note 47, at 547. Under Section 12(a)(2), by contrast, a plaintiff may
succeed by showing a failure to exercise reasonable care. See id.
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policies of Regulation FD,136 discussed below. It puts retail
investors in a position where the only thing they know about
upcoming offerings comes from analyst-filtered information, fed by
parties who may be on the underwriter's payroll. Moreover, a
blanket exclusion seems particularly inappropriate in light of
technology currently available, such as the Internet.'37
4. The "Order Book"
During or after the road show presentations the investment
banker's task is to evaluate market interest.138 Indications of
interest are recorded in a so-called "order book." "The objective is
usually to oversubscribe the issue by two or three times, which will
pretty much guarantee that the whole issue can be sold on pricing
day. ' '
At peak periods, an issuer's offering book may be
oversubscribed by as many as twenty or thirty times." That rate of
oversubscription is important, as it gives the underwriter an
indication of the extent to which demand exceeds supply at a given
price. 141 Though, as discussed below, expressions of interest
recorded in the order book are not binding by operation of law, a
broadly oversubscribed order book typically means that the IPO
will be "hot.',
4 2
136. SEC Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. 243.100-103 (2001) [hereinafter
Regulation FD].
137. See generally, Eddy, supra note 44, at 881 (supporting the such expansion
of road show information and noting "[w]ith increased technology and Internet
access, retail investors should be able to benefit from potential reductions in
informational asymmetries.").
138. See Hovarth, supra note 43, at 6; Ed McCarthy, Pricing IPO's: Science or
Science Fiction, J. OF Acct., Sept. 1999, at 51 ("For example, the investment
banker will know that, at $14 per share, the offering is oversubscribed 4 times; at
$15, it's oversubscribed 2 times, and so on.").
139. McCarthy, supra note 138.
140. See Hovarth, supra note 43, at 6.
141. Cf id
142. See id.
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D. The "Go-Ahead"
1. Pricing
Once the SEC declares a registration statement effective, the
underwriter sets a final price for the offering, and trading usually
begins within a day. 3 Determining the final price for an IPO,
however, is just the last step in a lengthy process.'"
At the outset of a public offering, the issuer and the
underwriter typically negotiate a range of acceptable prices for the
stock that will be distributed.'45 To arrive at that range, some
accounting benchmark must generally be used.'46 During the
Internet boom, Internet companies were valued using a number of
absurd criteria. The exorbitant prices of technology stocks were
often justified on the basis of non-financial merits such as web
traffic, "page views per user" and "engaged shoppers," with no
empirical evidence that these criteria translated into future profits
or revenues.
47
Obtaining an estimate for the value of a stock would have
been a more straightforward affair during less heady times. The
standard valuation method traditionally involves assessing the
issuer's net income, attaching a multiple which factors for the
143. See, e.g., Quad City Holdings Inc. Announces Public Offering, Bus.
WIRE, Oct. 7, 1993; see also Kushner-Locke Public Offering Declared Effective,
Bus. WIRE, July 26, 1996; United Therapeutics Corporation Announces
Registration Statement Declared Effective By SEC, ORIGIN UNIVERSAL NEWS
SERV. LTD, June 17, 1999; Safeguard Scientifics Announces Initial Offering Price
For Internet Capital Group IPO, PR NEWSWIRE, Aug. 4, 1999; MCSi, Inc.
Announces Initial Offering Price For Zengine, Inc. IPO, CAN. CORP. NEWSWIRE,
Sept. 20, 2000.
144. See Hovarth, supra note 43, at 6.
145. See Randolph P. Beatty, Issuer Expenses and Legal Liability in Initial
Public Offerings. 39 J. L. & ECON. 545, 549 (1996).
146. See McCarthy, supra note 138.
147. Gretchen Morgenson, How Did They Value Stocks? Count the Absurd
Ways; Those Lofty 'New Economy' Measures Fizzle, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2001,
at C1. The exorbitant price of Internet stocks was based in part on a litany of
information that did not reliably indicate a company's profits or revenues. See id.
Examples of such non-financial information included customer loyalty, website
traffic, and engaged shoppers. See id.
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issuer's growth prospects and the time value of money, and
company-specific market risk." The multiple incorporates into the
IPO's price estimate such intangible values as the quality of the
issuer's management team, the company's position in its major
markets, the value of its technology, and its capacity for
innovation.49 Traditionally, a issuer would need to demonstrate a
consistent track record of profits and stable growth before it could
launch an IPOY'o In contrast, Internet companies pioneered new
activities and seldom, if ever, showed a profit."' As discussed
below, Wall Street's response was to abandon traditional valuation
methods and to develop completely new substitutes.'52
Financial or accounting yardsticks do not predetermine an
IPO's final price. Ideally, market demand should be the sole
arbiter of a security's final price.' Under the efficient market
hypothesis - absent manipulation or other market imperfections
- the price established by market demand approximates the best
possible valuation methods."' The offering price negotiations with
the startup usually proceed on the basis of apparent market
demand, and conclude within twenty-four hours of the issue's
initial day of trading.'55 To assess market demand, the underwriter
relies on information collected during the road show and captured
148. See McCarthy, supra note 138.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152 See id.("[I]nstead of valuing the cable companies traditionally, at some
multiples of earnings, for example ... valued the firms based on their installed
customer base. This led to a valuation multiple based on the cable company's
subscribers.").
153. See Daniel R. Fischel, Symposium, On the Regulation of Secondary
Trading Markets: Program Trading, Volatility, Portfolio Insurance, and the Role
of Specialists and Market Makers: Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the
Fraud on the Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 907, 912-13 (1989).
154. Id.
155. See Stephen J. Schulte, IPO Roadshows Today: A Primer for the
Practitioner, 1068 PLI/CORP. 527, 533 (Sept. 1998) (explaining that the short turn-
around period maximizes the accuracy of the negotiated offering price, and that
given too much time in between the conclusion of negotiations and the actual
offering of securities to the public, the price will move too far north or south).
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in the order book. 156 The underwriter will apply such information
to narrow the range of possible prices initially filed with the SEC
into a single, definite price. 5'
2. Under-pricing
Though IPOs have usually been under-priced, trading price
run-ups during the first day of trading were particularly intense at
the end of the last decade.'58 While hot IPOs have traditionally
experienced price run-ups of up to twenty-five percent in the first
day of trading, during 1998 and 1999 run-ups of up to 200% were
not uncommon. 9 In one egregious instance, a particular stock
surged 900% over its offering price during the first day of trading."6
In 1999 and 2000, first day offering prices on average jumped 71%
and 57%, respectively, during the first day of trading.6' That
compares with an average of 11% from 1980 to 1998.62
As the quantity of shares that will be distributed in the
offering is fixed in the registration statement, investment bankers
cannot align demand and supply by simply issuing and distributing
more shares.'63 Instead, IPOs that have been under-priced relative
156. See id.
157. See Nancy Gondo, All Excited About IPOs? Snap Out of It, INVESTOR'S
Bus. DAILY, June 19, 1998, at B2.
158. See Hovarth, supra note 43, at 6. The systematic underpricing of IPOs is
a thoroughly documented empirical fact that has been documented for many
years. See, e.g., Anthony Saunders, Why Are So Many New Stock Issues
Underpriced?, Bus. REV., Mar./Apr. 1990, at 3 ("Considerable evidence shows
that new or initial public equity offerings.. .are underpriced on average."); John
C. Coffee, Jr., IPO Underpricing and Dutch Auctions, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 16, 1999, at
5 (noting that "the phenomenon of IPO underpricing [is] long a standard feature
of initial public offerings."); see also Coffee, The IPO Allocation Probe: Who Is
the Victim?, supra note 14, at 5.
159. Coffee, The IPO Allocation Probe: Who Is the Victim?, supra note 14, at
5.
160. Miriam Hill, Companies Don't Complain as Money Managers Cash in on
Their IPOs, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 1, 1999. The IPO in question was the Nov.
1998 distribution of TheGlobe.com, which grabbed headlines as the biggest IPO
run-up in history. See id.
161. Tully, Betrayal on Wall Street, supra note 18.
162 Id.
163. In SEC filings, the quantity of shares to be distributed is fixed, but not the
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to indications of market interest typically undergo a price "pop"
during the first day of trading, or an immediate run-up in value that
aligns supply and demand in the aftermarket. It is the price pop
that makes the IPO "hot."
According to NASD regulations, underwriters have almost
unlimited discretion with respect to IPO allocations that do not
involve broker-dealers. '" Upon determination of the offering
price, hot IPOs are typically sold and transferred overnight into the
accounts of those institutional investors that enjoy a good business
relationship with the underwriter. 6' Retail investors typically lack
access to hot IPOs, and even when they are able to participate,
they may be proscribed from cashing in their shares by restrictive
lock-up agreements.' Meanwhile, the institutional investors "flip"
or "spin" their stock allocations to secure an immediate profit from
the IPO's inflated trading price in the aftermarket 67
3. The Effects of Under-pricing on the Issuer
Underwriters in the United States typically require a flat fee
for the IPO's distribution, commonly equal to seven percent of the
final offering price.' Given the prevalent percentage-of-the-take
fee structure, it seems counterintuitive that investment bankers
purposefully attempt to under-price IPOs. Yet, during 1999 and
2000, at the height of the Internet craze, investment bankers left as
much as $62 billion "on the table" by under-pricing IPOs.1' For
example, Netscape left $151 million on the table during its 1995
IPO, or $11 million more than the amount the company raised
price at which they are to be offered. See id.
164. See NASD Free Riding and Withholding Interpretation, Rules 0100-3420
[hereinafter NASD Free Riding and Withholding Interpretation]. Note that the
citation to the Free-Riding and Withholding Interpretation is "IM-2110-1," which
means Interpretative Material under NASD Conduct Rule 2110, first
interpretation; see also the accompanying discussion in text infra Part III.B.1.
165. See Hill, supra note 160.
166. See id.
167. See id (unlike the retail purchasers, "the institutions often sell their shares
at the opening of public trading.").
16& Id.
169. Tully, Betrayal on Wall Street, supra note 18.
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from the offering.'70
At first blush, it may seem gratifying to company executives
that their IPO was so successful that it opened with a "price pop."'' .
A price run-up during the first day of trading would seem to justify
management's efforts to market and publicize the company's good
prospects. 172
However, a price pop is a telltale sign that an IPO has been
sold at an artificially low price. When a "price pop" occurs,
investors who could not get enough shares during the initial
offering try to "snap them up" in the aftermarket from investors
who value them less than they do.'73 An under-priced IPO can be
devastating for the issuer, diluting its stock and depriving it of
capital needed to fund research and development, launch
marketing campaigns, or simply stay afloat. 4 Moreover, an under-
priced IPO dilutes the holdings of the original stakeholders and
allows ownership of the firm to be transferred at a low price.'
4. The Alibis
Despite the negative impact of a hot IPO on the issuer, under-
pricing commonly takes place with the issuer's management's
implicit or express approval.' 76 As detailed below, this may be a
consequence of NASD regulations that allow the issuer to place
hot IPOs in the hands of management and other corporate insiders.
This apparent complicity by issuers has led to speculation that hot
IPOs are not a wholly innocent affair. 7
Certainly, there are some innocent explanations for the
170. See Vinzant, supra note 112, at HO.
171. See McCarthy, supra note 138.
172- See A Penny in Whose Pocket?, ECONOMIST, May 26, 2001 ("A big first-
day pop in [the issuers'] share price was viewed as a marketing success.").
173. See McCarthy, supra note 138.
174. See Abdul Rasheed et al., Determinants Of Price Premiums: A Study of
Initial Public Offerings in the Medical Diagnostics and Devices Industry, J. SMALL
BUS. MGMT., Oct. 1997, at 11.
175. Id. (including helpful examples).
176. See Mark D. Seltzer, 'Spinning' Hot Stocks: Is It a Crime?, Bus. CRIMES
BULL. COMPLIANCE & LITIG., Sept. 1998, at 7.
177. See Hill, supra note 160; A Penny in Whose Pocket?, supra note 172.
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systematic under-pricing of IPOs. For one, it has been argued that
stabilizing activities by the underwriter account for the rise in the
average price of stock sold in an IPO. Accordingly, underwriters
may simply be doing their best analysis in a market where the
demand for new issues is high and unusually volatile.' However, it
is unlikely that stabilizing activities can adequately explain the
excessive price run-ups that were regularly seen during the Internet
boom.
Another possible explanation for IPO under-pricing involves
the need to guarantee that the issue gets distributed quickly.'"
Firm commitment underwriters are especially apprehensive about
setting too high a price for an offering.' As such, an underwriter
may want to price the IPO lower than it deserves.'
Moreover, the price for an under-subscribed IPO can easily
collapse. 3 In that case, the underwriter must either subscribe itself
to the issue or sell the stock at a deflated price, incurring
substantial per share losses."f It may therefore make sense for a
firm commitment underwriter to regularly under-price IPOs
despite the industry's flat seven percent per share fee structure.'
8 5
These justifications are not entirely plausible, however, because it
178. See Royce R. Barondes, Dynamic Economic Analyses of Selected
Provisions of Corporate Law: The Absolute Delegation Rule, Disclosure of
Intermediate Estimates and IPO Pricing, 7 DEPAUL BUS. L. J. 97, 127 n.105
(1994). Stabilizing refers to the practice of underwriters to systematically bid for
or purchase securities subject to distribution at a price just below the offering
price in order to maintain an orderly market; the aftermarket for new issues can
be thin and very unpredictable. See id.
179. See Hill, supra note 160 (noting that "[b]oth the investment bankers and
the issuers they take public say they are doing their best in a market in which new
issues go from cold to hot overnight.").
180. See Rasheed, supra note 175, at 11.
181. In a firm commitment offering, the underwriter agrees to purchase all the
shares in the offering before they are distributed to investors. Firm commitment
offerings tie up the underwriter's capital, thereby providing an incentive to
dispose of all the shares quickly. See generally, McCarthy, supra note 138.
18Z See id.
183. Rasheed, supra note 175, at 11.
184. See id.
185. See id. (stating that because of firm underwriting commitments, "it may
actually be in the best interest of the underwriter to keep the issue price
relatively low.").
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has been empirically demonstrated that best efforts underwriting
typically results in more severe under-pricing than firm
commitment underwriting. 6
The influence of institutional politics and public relations
provides another possible innocent explanation for the IPO under-
pricing phenomenon.'87 According to some industry observers, an
IPO's offering price should never be determined solely on the basis
of market demand considerations." A high-priced offering may
come back to haunt the issuer and the underwriter in the form of
lawsuits from disgruntled investors who have incurred losses from
a price collapse.'89
Moreover, the issuer has a vested interest in keeping
institutional investors happy because they hold the keys to
successful secondary offerings."9 It may therefore be against the
issuer's long-term interest to hoard stock gains by requiring a high
offering price during its IPO."' Instead, the first issue should be
186. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law:
Articles and Comments; The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 1989
COLUM. L. REV. 1549 n.42 (referring to a five-year survey which showed that
investors in best efforts offerings are compensated by a greater underpricing
effect than firm commitment investors).
187. Ed McCarthy, for example, advocates "keeping everybody happy" -
Although the company hires the underwriters and pays the IPO fees, the
investment banker must balance the conflicting goals of several audiences. The
issuer wants the highest price - within reason - for its shares, while investors
want to pay the lowest price. Overpricing the issue increases the risk of a poor
after-market performance, which can lead to lawsuits from disgruntled
investors...
"[L]eaving something on the table" serves several purposes. It entices
institutional investors to buy the issue because they are getting a bargain, and
their participation is usually critical to selling out an issue. Assuming the
stock's price moves up to its fair value in the after-market - the IPO price
"pop" - investors earn a fast return as a reward for investing in an unseasoned
issue. Underpricing also serves a defensive purpose. Should a disgruntled
investor claim the issue was overpriced, the investment bank can point to its
valuation method and the discount as evidence of its conservative practices.
McCarthy, supra note 138.
188. See id.
189. See id. (noting that overpricing an IPO increases the risk of poor after-
market performance, possibly resulting in lawsuits from disgruntled investors).
190. See Hovarth, supra note 43, at 6.
191. See id.
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purposely under-priced in order to "leave a good taste in investors'
mouths."'"*
5. The Damning Version
Although the above are all plausible explanations for some
instances of IPO under-pricing during the Internet boom, the
problem was so severe, widespread, and persistent that a more
sinister account has been gaining increasing currency among the
media, Congress, and academics.'93
Oversubscribed IPOs are, by their very nature, a scarce
commodity."' Any investor lucky enough to be allocated shares of
a hot IPO is virtually guaranteed a risk-free profit by "flipping" it
in the aftermarket. Investment banks are under a legal obligation
to make a bona fide distribution of a securities offering.195 In other
words, an investment bank is barred from hoarding hot IPOs or
itself flipping them."9 However, an investment bank generally has
full discretion in allocating all IPOs, at least as long as certain
restricted individuals such as broker-dealers do not receive any."9
The investment bank typically allocates IPOs to preferred clients,
such as institutional investors.9 However, there is often a quid pro
quo in effect, which may either be explicit or implicit depending on
the circumstances. If the institutional investor expects to receive
hot IPOs in the future, it must behave like a good client -
increasing its trading volume at the investment bank and thereby
192. See Linda Canina, Initial Public Offerings in The Hospitality Industry -
Underpricing and Overperformance, CORNELL HOTEL & RESTAURANT ADMIN.
Q., Oct. 1996 (discussing and providing examples of hospitality industry IPOs).
193. See generally, Elstrom, supra note 2, at EB16; Toedtman, supra note 2, at
A63; see also Coffee, The IPO Allocation Probe: Who Is the Victim?, supra note
14, at 5.
194. See generally, Coffee, The IPO Allocation Probe: Who Is the Victim?,
supra note 14, at 5-6.
195. See id. at 6.
196. See id.
197. See id. ("Nor do SEC or NASD rules attempt to confine the
underwriter's discretion [in regard to who receives IPO shares], at least so long as
the underwriter does not allocate to itself, affiliates, or others within the
underwriter community.").
198. Id.
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the amount of commissions.1"
A small investor with no Wall Street connections will typically
be locked out of a hot offering at least until it reaches the
aftermarket. However, small investors played a key role in the
Internet boom, by feeding into the insatiable market appetite for
technology stocks and driving up the prices and trading volumes.'
Analysts on the payroll of Wall Street investment banks induced
that frenzied demand for new issues by painting rosy forecasts that
were nothing better than crass sales pitches.'
In fact, the reputation of the "hallowed Wall Street analyst"
has been so battered by the profession's behavior during the
Internet boom that the SEC recently took the unprecedented step
of explicitly advising investors not to rely solely on analysts'
reports when they make decisions about buying and selling
stocks. 3 This move followed a surge of complaints by investors
who lost heavily by adhering to analyst recommendations.'
According to the SEC, analysts are frequently in a position of an
inherent conflict of interest.'
Assisted by armies of irrepressibly optimistic analysts, Wall
Street investment banks corrupted the IPO process into a form of
quasi-legal commercial bribery, with which to attract their
institutional clients, venture capitalists, corporate executives, and
others. Indeed, Wall Street insiders have profited handsomely
from IPOs. According to Wall Street syndicate managers,
institutional investors such as mutual funds acquire about sixty
199. See id. ("[S]ome among the favored few that receive 'hot' IPO allocations
appear to have paid for the privilege - typically in the form of above-market
brokerage commissions. Different means exist by which the underwriters'
affection can be so purchased.").
200. See id.
201. Gretchen Morgenson, Regulators Are Waking Up to Conflicts, N.Y.
TIMES, June 10, 2001, § 1, at 3.
202. See id.
203. See Gretchen Morgenson, SEC Warns Investors On Analysts, N.Y.
TIMES, June 30, 2001, at C1.
204. See id.
205. See id (noting that conflicts arise when the research department is too
closely tied to the brokerage department, when analysts own the stock that they
write about, and when a firm's investment banking arm pays the analyst for her
work).
THE HOT IPO PHENOMENON
percent of the typical IPO offering and as much as eighty percent
of the shares of certain big IPOs.' During 1999 and 2000, eighty
percent of an offering usually went to about 125 mutual funds,
which quickly flipped their stock in the aftermarket and collected
risk-free profits.' "Within a week or two, all but ten or 15" would
"dump" their shares." Moreover, institutional investors usually
got the best IPOs - retail investors got 46% of the IPOs that
either fell or were flat on the first day of trading, but only 24% of
the IPOs that rose dramatically.'
E. The Lock-up Period
The last stage of the underwriting process involves the lock-up
period. Parties subject to a lock-up agreement cannot sell the
stock obtained in an offering until the expiration of the
agreement.21 According to some critics, lock-up agreements serve
to further disadvantage small investors while adding fuel to an
already hot offering."'
Lock-up agreements can serve to maintain price stability and
preserve investor confidence by ensuring that insiders or other
holders of substantial blocks of stock cannot dump their stock
shortly after the offering and cause panic selling.2 Parties subject
to a lock-up agreement will generally hold their shares even after
the agreement has expired. 3 Nevertheless, panic selling is an all
too real possibility that may negatively affect an issuer's prospects
206. See Zweig & Spiro, supra note 27.
207. See Tully, Betrayal on Wall Street, supra note 18.
208. Id.
209. Vinzant, supra note 112, at H01 (quoting Irv DeGraw, research director
at WorldFinanceNet, as saying, "[a]s an individual, if you can get all of an
offering you want, you don't want it.").
210. See id.
211. See Stuart Varney, IPO Experts Agree Offerings Come Out in 'Rigged
Market', CNN, May 30, 1995 (citing experts who argue that the IPO process is
thoroughly manipulated by underwriters).
212. See Lock-Up Expiration Fear Is Unfounded, IPO REP., May 1, 2000.
213. See id. (referring to a recent Thomson Financial Investor Services report
which stated that, "[i]nvestor relations officers that worry about their company's
stock price slipping after the lock-up period expires should not be
concerned .... ").
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for future financing. For example, the stock price for Divine
Interventures tumbled 35% in a single day, when forty million of
Divine's 136 million shares became eligible for trading after the
expiration of a lock-up agreement."5
However, lock-up agreements can assist in generating hot
IPOs, particularly when stock that is subject to a lock-up is sold not
to insiders or institutional investors, but to the general public.21'6
Indeed, plaintiffs in securities litigation arising from the aftermath
of the Internet boom have suggested that lock-up agreements may
be illegal because they constrict supply and discriminate among
classes of customers.' The agreements may help trigger a price
explosion the first day of trading, inducing small investors to buy at
inflated prices."' At the same time, institutional investors or other
favored customers of the underwriter, who are not subject to lock-
ups or are able to successfully challenge their enforcement, happily
sell.219
III. THE ROLE OF ANALYSTS
The Supreme Court has recognized that analysts play a crucial
role in maintaining a healthy market by providing an objective
evaluation of the prospects of individual companies.'2 Indeed,
analysts play a key role in evaluating, verifying, and researching
corporate disclosures required by the securities laws, and in
disseminating company-specific information to the market as a
whole.' According to the SEC, "analysts actively seek out bits
214. See id. ("However, [Thomson Financial Investor Services Senior
Managing Director Richard Wines] warned that companies should expect some
degree of volatility in the period following the expiration of the lock-up
period.").
215. Barbara Rose, Divine Interventures Shares Tumble 35%; Investors Jump
at Is' Sell Opportunity, CHICAGO TRIB., Jan. 9, 2001, at Bus. 1.
216. See Ed Leefeldt, Public's Cut; An Assistant New York Attorney General
Heads Two Class-Action Suits to Get Small Investors a Piece of the IPO Price,
ORANGE COUNTY REG., May 14,2000.
217. See id.
21& See id.
219. See id.
220. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983).
221. See Paul B. Brountas, Jr., Note, Rule 10b-5 and Voluntary Corporate
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and pieces of corporate information not generally known to the
market for the express purpose of analyzing that information and
informing their clients who, in turn, can be expected to trade on
the basis of the information conveyed."'  Analysts obtain earnings
data and forward-looking information, and check for accuracy,
fraud, and bias.' Also, analysts systematically collect information
regarding federal actions, interest rates, and social and economic
trends to evaluate their impact on the companies they that
evaluate. ' Analysts then issue investment recommendations to
their employers, a select group of clients, or to the investing public
as a whole.'m
Analysts, however, sometimes mislead small investors when
disseminating corporate information. ' 6 Some commentators have
alleged that this problem is particularly acute in the IPO context.'
In congressional hearings, analysts have been accused of
manipulating small investors, by way of wildly optimistic forecasts,
into purchasing stock underwritten by the analysts' employers.'
On the other hand, some Wall Street analysts work at research-
only investment houses, typically affiliated with a broker-dealer,
Disclosures to Securities Analysts, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1517, 1519-20 (1992).
222- In re Raymond L. Dirks, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17,480,
SEC Docket 1401, 47 S.E.C. 434 (Jan. 22, 1981).
223. See Brountas, supra note 221, at 1520.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. Susan Pulliam, Abercrombie & Fitch Ignites Controversy over Possible
Leaks of Sluggish Sales, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 1999, at C1.
227. According to a New York Times editorial -
Simply put, the independence of analysts' research was often subverted to serve
the interests of their firms' highly profitable investment banking operations.
Fearful that negative research reports would curtail their ability to land
opportunities to underwrite initial public offerings, some firms had their deal
makers review analysts' work, and tied the analysts' compensation to income
from deal-making in the industries they cover.
Wall Street's Conflicted Research, N.Y. TIMEs, June 15, 2001, at A38.
228. See Gretchen Morgenson, Wall Street's Analysis Put on the Defensive at a
Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2001, at C4. This behavior is credited to the
unethical conduct of analysts and conflicts of interests that pervade Wall Street.
Id. Recently the Securities Industry Association issued a voluntary set of
standards for practice, one change in particular is that research departments
should not report to investment banking executives. Id.
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that do not engage in capital market transactions with the
companies they cover.' Other analysts work on the buy-side for
institutional investors and rarely publish their research."
Nonetheless, analysts play an integral role when investment
banks solicit issuers as underwriting clients. 1 Generally, issuers
prefer an underwriter whose analysts can provide long-term
support. 2  Moreover, investment banks rely on analysts'
knowledge of the issuing business during the pre-IPO due diligence
investigation that is required by securities laws." Analysts also
support the sales and marketing aspect of the underwriting process,
and provide the quarterly and yearly earnings estimates that are
used to help determine price.' Finally, analysts typically issue a
positive report on the issuer, usually twenty-five days after the
offering, in order to maintain interest in the offering and to
facilitate price stabilization. 5
There is an inherent conflict of interest between the research
and underwriting aspects of investment banking. 6 Some company
executives refuse to hire those investment banks whose analysts
have downgraded the company's stock in the past. 7 Investment
229. See Testimony of Gregg Hymowitz, Founding Partner of Entrust Capital,
Before the House Financial Services Committee Subcommittee on Capital Markets,
Insurance and Government-Sponsored Enterprises Hearings on Financial Services
Accuracy, FDCH CONG. TESTIMONY, June 14,2001.
230. Id.
231. See Vinzant, supra note 112, at H01; see also Joseph McLaughlin, The
Changing Role of the Securities Analyst in Initial Public Offerings, 8 INSIGHTS 6
(1994).
232- See McCune, supra note 56, at 23.
233. See McLaughlin, supra note 231, at 7.
234. See id.
235. See id.; see also Hovarth, supra note 43, at 6.
236. See Ron Insana, Represenatives Richard Baker and Michael Oxley
Discuss Today's Congressional hearings on the Securities Industry, CNBC NEWS
TRANSCRIPTS, June 14, 2001.
237. See Testimony by Dalmon Silvers, Associate General Counsel of the AFL-
CIO Before the House Financial Services Committee Subcommittee on Capital
Markets, Insurance and Government-Sponsored Enterprises Hearing on Financial
Market Analysis Accuracy, FDCH CONG. TESTIMONY, June 14, 2001; see also
Testimony of David W. Tice, Portfolio Manager of Prudent Bear Fund and
Publisher of the Institutional Research Service "Behind the Numbers" Before the
House Financial Services Committee Subcommittee on Capital Markets,
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banks seeking to mend fences with company executives often
pressure or even fire the analysts responsible for negative ratings.s
Moreover, an investment bank can earn higher profits if analysts
whip up the intense demand that, when coupled with a constricted
supply, generates hot IPOs. 39
During the Internet boom, according to certain experts some
analysts behaved like nothing more than glorified salespeople for
their firms' offerings.' ° In 2000, investors who followed the advice
of analysts employed by investment banks that underwrote the
recommended stocks, lost an average of 52% of their
investments.2 ' That compares to a loss of only four percent over
the same period, for those investors who followed the
recommendations of analysts working at research-only firms.2
Insurance, and Government-Sponsored Enterprises Hearing on Financial Market
Analysis Accuracy, FDCH CONG. TESTIMONY, June 14, 2001.
23& See Gretchen Morgenson, How Did So Many Get it So Wrong, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 31, 2000 at C1 (quoting Mitch Zacks of Zacks Investment Research
as saying "the way an analyst can get fired is to damage an existing investment
banking relationship with a company or sour a future investment banking
relationship. The way you do that as an analyst is coming out and telling people
to sell a stock.").
239. See Vinzant, supra note 112, at H01.
240. See, e.g., Peter Elkind, Where Mary Meeker Went Wrong; She May Be the
Greatest Dealmaker Around. The Problem Is, She's Supposed to Be an Analyst,
FORTUNE, May 14, 2001, at 68 (discussing the track record of Mary Meeker, "the
unquestioned diva of the Internet Age," who was paid an eye-popping $15
million in 1999 to analyze companies that had underwriting relationships with
Meeker's employer, Morgan Stanley); see also Marilyn Geewax, Congress Warns
Stock Analysts May Face Regulation, Cox NEWS SERV. (June 14, 2001), (quoting
Financial Services Committee Chairman Representative Michael Oxley, R-Ohio
as saying, "I'm distressed by the statistic that as the markets were crashing last
year, less than 2 percent of analyst recommendations were to sell. Analysts are
so important to the marketplace that the last thing we need is the perception that
they're nothing more than hucksters."). See generally, Wall Street's Conflicted
Research, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2001, at 38. (reporting on the June 12, 2001
issuance of voluntary guidelines from the Securities Industry Association
designed to encourage greater independence of analysts' research from the
investment banking operations at their firms).
241. See Breaking Point for U.S. Brokers, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REv., June 19,
2001, at 62 (citing data produced by the online investment information service,
Investors.com).
242 See id.
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A. The "Chinese Wall"
Millions of people who bought into the dot-com frenzy
understandably feel resentful toward celebrity Wall Street analysts
who, relying on innovative valuation criteria, kept pumping out
"buy" recommendations on high-flying stock prices that had
reached untenable levels. 3 Given the potential for conflicts of
interest, a "Chinese Wall" has traditionally separated a firm's
securities analysts from its investment banking department, to
preserve market integrity.2
"Information is the lifeblood of [the] securities market." '
Misinformation by financial analysts can render dysfunctional the
market pricing mechanism that determines which industries receive
precious resources, thus undermining the foundation of
capitalism.2' Wall Street analysts shoot themselves in the foot if
their research is perceived as biased, as they quickly lose their
investors' trust. 7 However, the credibility that analysts already
enjoy with the investing public may be subject to abuse2 when
243. See Wall Street's Conflicted Research, supra note 240, at A38.
244. See McLaughlin, supra note 231, at 6 (concluding that an analyst is not
"tainted" when brought "over the wall" if the analyst's role is clearly disclosed to
the issuer); see also Toedtman, supra note 2, at A63 (noting that at the House
Financial Services subcommittee hearing on June 14, 2001, the industry was
criticized for, apparent conflicts of interest and urged to rebuild the "Chinese
Wall").
245. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Release Nos. 33-7881, 34-43154,
IC-24599, 2000 SEC LEXIS 1672, at *2 (Dec. 20, 1999).
246. See Hearing on Analyzing the Analysts: Are Investors Getting Unbiased
Research from Wall Street? Before the House Subcomm. On Capital Markets,
Insurance and Government-Sponsored Enterprises, FDCH CONG. TESTIMONY,
(June 14, 2001) (statement of David W. Tice, David W. Tice & Associates, Inc.).
247. See The Analyst Paradox: If They're so Plagued with Conflicts, Why Do
They Do Such a Good Job?: Hearing on Analyzing the Analysts: Are Investors
Getting Unbiased Research from Wall Street? Before the House Subcomm. On
Capital Markets, Insurance and Government-Sponsored Enterprises, FDCH
CONG. TESTIMONY, (June 14, 2001) (statement of James K. Glassman, Resident
Fellow, American Enterprise Institute) (arguing that conflicts of interest are not
a big problem because analysts' reports are closely followed under the "full glare
of publicity.").
248. See McLaughlin, supra note 231, at 7 (noting that while earning estimates
from investment bankers may be regarded as "tainted," an analyst's estimates
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they fail to disclose underwriting agreements between their
employers and the companies they review. 9 Indeed, the "Chinese
Wall" separating research and underwriting is not just the result of
good practice and industry self-regulation. ° Rather, investment
bankers need the separation to avoid legal pitfalls.251
1. Legal Requirements and Regulatory Pitfalls
a.) Gun-Jumping and Conditioning the Market
The involvement of analysts in the underwriting effort puts the
issuer and the investment bank in a delicate regulatory position.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has described the
relationship between an issuer and its analyst as a form of
"corporate brinkmanship" 2 and a "fencing match conducted on a
tightrope." 3 Moreover, the SEC has actively sought to "electrify"
this tightrope."'
will have greater credibility with salespeople and customers).
249. See id.; see also Carol Vinzant, Merrill Alters Guidelines for Analysts,
WASH. POST, June 19, 2001, at E01 (stating that Merrill Lynch & Co. will begin
disclosing its potential corporate conflicts of interests on the front of analyst
reports in bold lettering rather then small type at the back of the report); Carol
Vinzant, Wall Street Group Issues Analysts' Code, WASH. POST, June 13, 2001, at
E01 (reporting that the Securities Industry Association voluntary guidelines,
issued on June 12, 2001, encourage analysts to disclose which companies are also
investment banking clients of their firm).
250. See McLaughlin, supra note 231, at 7.
251. See id.
252. See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 158 (2d Cir. 1980)
(referring to the disclosure of nonpublic, business related information to
analysts).
253. See SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 9 (2d Cir. 1977) (describing
corporate executives as being "... compelled to parry often incisive questioning
[from an analyst] while teetering on the fine line between data properly conveyed
and material inside information that may not be revealed without simultaneously
releasing it to the public.").
254. Carl W. Schneider, Fencing on the Electrified Tightrope: Shocking
Executives Who Value Reputation, 5 INSIGHTS 2 (1991) (citing Commissioner
Edward H. Fleischman, Ferreting in the Interstices of SEC Attitudes to Securities
Analysts, Speech Presented to the Eighteenth Annual Securities Regulation
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As discussed above, Section 5(c) of the Securities Act makes it
unlawful to offer to sell a security unless a registration statement
has been filed.25 Under Section 5(b), a security may be legally
offered after the filing of the registration statement but before it
has been declared effective, provided that the prospectus used for
this purpose contains the information specified in Section 10 of the
Securities Act." In general, after the filing but before the
registration statement has been declared effective, only a statutory
prospectus may be offered. 7
An analyst, however, routinely publishes business evaluations
of companies that may be preparing for an offering. According to
the SEC, these reports "may in fact contribute to conditioning the
public mind or arousing public interest in the company or in the
securities of a company in a manner which raises a serious question
whether the publicity is not in fact part of the selling effort."2'
b.) Insider Trading
An analyst who goes "over the wall" to the underwriting side
of investment banking should consider the potential for exposure
to insider trading liability. In particular, analysts often rely on
"material nonpublic information" to prepare a report on the issuer
released twenty-five days after the IPO.259 The report will contain
earning projections based on the nonpublic information.2"
However, an analyst may not downgrade or upgrade an issuer's
Institute, University of California, San Diego (Jan. 24, 1991)).
255. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2000).
256. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (2000). As discussed below, the term "prospectus" as
used in the securities laws is a term of art that includes "any prospectus, notice,
circular, advertisement, letter, or communication, written or by radio or
television, which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of any security."
15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (2000). A Section 10 prospectus is a prospectus containing
certain specified information, including information regarding the issuer's
business, assets, and financial condition. 15 U.S.C. § 77j (2000).
257. See 15 U.S.C. § 77j.
258. Publication of Information Prior to or After the Effective Date of a
Registration Statement, Securities Act Release No. 33,3844, 22 F.R. 8359 (Oct. 8,
1957).
259. See McLaughlin, supra note 231, at 7.
260. Id.
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stock on the basis of this "nonpublic" information. 1
1.) Dirks v. SEC
In Dirks v. SEC, the Supreme Court introduced a standard for
insider trading liability that requires the receipt of a direct or
indirect pecuniary benefit by the tipper.2 Raymond Dirks, a
financial analyst and officer of a broker-dealer firm, uncovered a
massive fraud after receiving a tip from an insider at Equity
Funding, an insurance company that he regularly followed. 3
Fraudulent corporate practices caused the company's assets to be
greatly overstated." The Court determined that Dirks' tipper had
received no direct or indirect personal benefit from tipping, but
had instead been prompted by a desire to uncover and "air out"
the fraud. 5 The case also involved an appeal of a censure by the
SEC against Dirks.
Dirks verified the fraud by interviewing some Equity Funding
employees. 6 He then sought to publicly disclose the fraud by
contacting a reporter from the Wall Street Journal, yet the reporter
declined to write the story out of fear of a libel charge. 7 During
this time, Dirks remained in contact with a number of clients and
investors, including five investment advisers who liquidated a total
of more than $16 million in Equity Funding's stock, driving down
the price from $26 to less than $15." 6 For such limited disclosures,
the SEC censured Dirks. 9
Citing Chiarella v. United States, the Supreme Court reversed
the SEC's censure, reasoning that Dirks owed no fiduciary duty to
Equity Funding shareholders and had not misappropriated any
information." ° In Chiarella, the Supreme Court stated that liability
261. See id.
262 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 667 (1983).
263. Id. at 648-49.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 667.
266. Id. at 649.
267. Id. at 649-50.
268. Id. at 650.
269. Id. at 652.
270. Id. at 665, 667.
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for insider trading can only attach where a relationship of trust and
confidence exists between the person who exploits the inside
information and the shareholders of the company.2I Dirks was not
an officer, director, or controlling shareholder of Equity Funding
and consequently did not violate §10(b) of the Securities Act by
"remaining silent" with respect to other market participants (i.e.,
by failing to disclose) when his clients traded on the material
information."n
Dirks reiterated the principles developed in Chiarella." In
particular, the Court explicitly rejected the view that a breach of
fiduciary duty occurs whenever inside information is intentionally
disclosed to securities traders. 4  Under Chiarella, there is no
general duty to ignore selectively disclosed information, nor to
forego market transactions "based on material, nonpublic
information.""5
Dirks supplements the Chiarella standard for determining
liability for insider trading. Specifically, "the test is whether the
insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his
disclosure. Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach
271. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980).
272. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 651. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act of 1934
prohibits the use "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security... [of]
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe." 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000).
Pursuant to this section, the SEC promulgated Rule 10-b5, which in relevant part
provides that -
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001).
273. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667.
274. See id.
275. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233.
THE HOT IPO PHENOMENON
of duty to stockholders. ' ' 6 Moreover, the Court emphasized in
Dirks that the benefit received must approximate "[a] pecuniary
gain or reputational benefit that will translate into future
earnings."' Because the insider from whom Dirks had received
the tip did not directly or indirectly benefit from tipping, the
censure of Dirks by the SEC could not stand. 8
It is worth noting that under Chiarella, an analyst who, for the
benefit of his employer, exploits privileged information obtained in
the course of an underwriting, could be found guilty of insider
trading. An analyst may not misappropriate information to which
he had access only for another, narrow, purpose.279 An analyst who
passes any of that informaticn to his employer's institutional clients
has breached his employer's fiduciary duties towards the
underwriting candidate.' Under Dirks, the benefit to the analyst
and his employer has to be direct and tangible, such as larger year-
end bonuses and other pecuniary compensation for the analyst,
and higher trading revenues and other "kickbacks" from
institutional clients for the employer.'
A failure to preserve the "Chinese Wall" between the research
and underwriting aspects of investment banking could give rise to
insider trading liability, particularly in light of the SEC's narrow
reading of key Supreme Court rulings. Indeed, there is no sign of
276. Dirks, 463 U.S at 662.
277. Id. at 663.
278. See id. at 667.
279. The Supreme Court further developed the misappropriation theory of
insider trading in Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). In that case, a
reporter and an associate working for the Wall Street Journal were convicted of
wire fraud because they had traded on information that belonged to their
employer, namely information to be published on the "Heard on the Street"
column, which the reporter co-authored. See id. at 23, 28. The Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction. See id. at 28. The Supreme Court expressly endorsed the
misappropriation theory of insider trading in United States v. O'Hagan; that case
involved an attorney trading in the securities of a target company in a tender
offer, where the attorney's law firm represented the bidder. United States v.
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
280. See generally, Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19.
281. See David Haffenreffer & Christine Romans, Paying the Price for Greed
on Wall Street, CNNFN, June 19, 2001, transcript #06190cb.126, available at
http://www.fdch.com (last visited June 24, 2001).
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the SEC backing away from its restrictive interpretation of the
Supreme Court's potentially industry-friendly precedents. 2
Currently, the SEC vigorously criticizes companies that have
favored securities analysts or institutional investors with
information that is more timely or extensive than that available to
the general public. 3
2.) SEC v. Stevens
Slowly but surely, the SEC has sought to chip away at the
protections against insider trading liability in Dirks and Chiarella.
In SEC v. Stevens, the Commission alleged that Phillip J. Stevens,
former C.E.O. and Chairman of Ultrasystems Corporation, sought
to protect his professional reputation by selectively disclosing
material information to securities analysts.2" In 1984, following
unexpectedly negative quarterly earnings results, an analyst had
publicly challenged Stevens' representations regarding the
corporation's financial figures. 5 The SEC alleged that Stevens
perceived this challenge as injurious to his reputation as a
manager.286 Accordingly, in 1987, when it became clear that
revenues for the first quarter of 1988 would be significantly lower
282. See Stephen A. Radin, Selective Disclosure After the SEC's Regulation
FD, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 31, 2000, at 1. But cf. Theodore A. Levine & Hardy Callcott,
Focus on Insider Trading; SEC Examines Relationship Between Issuers and
Analysts, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 7, 1992; see also McLaughlin, supra note 231; John C.
Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Securities Analyst, N.Y.L.J., May 30, 1991, at 5;
Daniel R. Fischel, Insider Trading and Investment Analysts: An Economic
Analysis of Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv.
127 (1984) (positing that the more widespread interpretation by commentators is
that the Supreme Court's protection of industry actors is quite broad).
283. See Mark I. Sokolow & Michael C. O'Brien, SEC Proposes Disclosure,
Trading Rules, N.Y.L.J., June 12, 2000, at S8. For excellent examples of such
critical treatment, see George Anders, Webvan to Delay IPO in Response to SEC
Concerns, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1999, at C16; Susan Pulliam, SEC Investigates
Possible Disclosure at Abercrombie, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1999, at C22; Susan
Pulliam & Gary McWilliams, Compaq Is Criticized for How It Disclosed PC
Troubles, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 2, 1999.
284. SEC v. Phillips, Litigation Release No. 12813, 1991 SEC LEXIS 451(Mar.
19, 1991) at C1.
285. See id. at *2.
286. See id.
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than anticipated, Stevens attempted to prevent another incident
like that of 1984. ' He placed a number of unsolicited calls to
several securities analysts, "recklessly disclosing" material
information that had not yet been made publicly available "in
order to protect and enhance his reputation."' This represented a
direct, tangible benefit to Stevens' status as a corporate manager
and to his continued earning power as a chief executive, thus
satisfying Supreme Court standards for insider trading. u9
The information that Stevens had selectively disclosed was
released to the public on the very same afternoon that Stevens
made his disclosures. Nonetheless, by then two of the securities
analysts contacted by Stevens had already tipped off their clients,
who promptly dumped their stock.2"° Stevens consented to an
injunction against future violations of Sections 17(a) of the
Securities Act and 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("Exchange Act"), as well as to an order requiring him to pay
$126,455, "the amount of losses avoided by those shareholders who
received material nonpublic information concerning Ultrasystem's
expected first quarter earnings, and who sold Ultrasystems' stock
prior to the public announcement of Ultrasystems' anticipated
results.""29  Stevens marked a victory for those who advocate
equality or parity of information among all market participants." 2
Other commentators, however, have charged that by equating
selective disclosure with securities fraud, Stevens is built on a
dubious theory that "trivializes" Dirks and shrinks it "from a
landmark decision to the status of a legal footnote."293 Indeed, it is
not altogether clear that Stevens and Dirks can be reconciled.
Although Stevens was never litigated, the "reputational" benefit
alleged by the SEC is probably too vague to satisfy the liability
287. See id.
288. Id.
289. See id. at *2-3.
290. See Schneider, supra note 254; see also SEC v. Stevens, Litigation Release
No. 12813, 1991 SEC LEXIS 451 (Mar. 19, 1991).
291. Id. at *1.
292. See Dean Foust, The Do's and Don'ts of Feeding Wall Street Analysts,
Bus. WK., Apr. 8, 1991, at 27.
293. Coffee, The SEC and the Securities Analyst, supra note 282, at 5; see also
Schneider, supra note 254.
20011
66 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VII
FINANCIAL LAW
standards under Dirks. After all, a tipper's desire "to protect and
enhance his reputation" is a very weak standard.29' It would
probably be satisfied in all cases of selective disclosure that are not
wholly unintentional where the tipper has not received a bribe or
other pecuniary benefit or himself traded on the material
information, as required by Dirks.295
c.) Regulation FD
The SEC would eventually seek to avoid the Dirks "personal
benefit" test by invoking its authority to set disclosure standards
under §§13(a) and 15(d) of the Exchange Act, as well as § 30 of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 ("Investment Company Act"). 96
Regulation FD sidesteps Supreme Court precedent and clarifies
the legal status of individuals who pass tips to analysts and other
insiders but who do not derive personal pecuniary benefit from the
tip.2' The requirements imposed by Regulation FD are twofold.29
First, Regulation FD addresses the manner in which disclosures of
material nonpublic information must be made.299 In particular, an
issuer that intends to disclose material nonpublic information must
do so through public disclosure, and not through selective
disclosure to analysts, institutional investors or others.3" Under
Rule 100(a)(1), Regulation FD requires that an issuer who
"intentionally" discloses material nonpublic information to a
selected party must simultaneously disclose that same information
to the investing public as a whole."' An intentional disclosure
294. See Coffee, The SEC and the Securities Analyst, supra note 282, at 5.
295. See id.
296. Regulation FD, supra note 136, 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-03 (2001).
Specifically, in adopting Regulation FD, the SEC invoked its authority under the
following provisions of the securities laws: 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c, 78i, 78m, 78o, 78w,
78mm and 80a-2. See id.
297. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230, 240, 243, 249; see also Roberta S. Karmel, Avoiding
Precedents by Adopting Insider Trading Rules, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 21, 2000, at 3. For
a discussion of relevant Supreme Court precedent, see Brountas, supra note 221,
at 1529.
298. See Sokolow & O'Brien, supra note 283, at S8.
299. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 243, 249 (2001).
300. See id.
301. Rule 100(a) provides in full -
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occurs when the individual making the disclosure knows or
recklessly disregards knowledge prior to the disclosure that the
disclosure involves material nonpublic information."
The second requirement of Regulation FD addresses
corrective action in the event of selective disclosure.' An issuer
who learns about a non-intentional disclosure must disclose to the
market as a whole the information that was accidentally revealed. "
Specifically, Rule 100(a)(2) requires that public disclosure must be
made "promptly," a term narrowly defined to mean as soon as
reasonably practicable, but in no event later than twenty-four
hours after a senior official of the issuer learns about the non-
intentional disclosure.'
Regulation FD also describes how public disclosure must be
carried out. Filing a Form 8-K with the SEC describing the
relevant information will fulfill the public disclosure
requirements." Alternatively, an issuer may disseminate the
information by a press release through a widely circulated news or
wire service, or by "any other method of disclosure that is
reasonably designed to provide broad public access to the
Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, whenever an issuer, or any
person acting on his behalf, discloses any material nonpublic information
regarding that issuer or its securities to any person or persons outside the issuer,
the issuer shall:
In the case of an intentional disclosure, make public disclosure of that
information simultaneously; and
In the case of non-intentional disclosure, make public disclosure of that
information promptly.
17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2001).
302. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(a) (2001).
303. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-03 (2001).
304. See id.
305. See id. at § 243.100(a); Regulation FD, supra note 136, 17 C.F.R. §
243.101(d) (2001).
306. See id. at § 243.101(e)(1). Form 8-K is the "current report" form used to
report material events or corporate changes not previously reported by the
company in a quarterly report (Form 10-Q) or annual report (Form 10-K). See
www.sec.gov/answers/form8k.htm (last visited June 30, 2001). A sample Form 8-
K is available at www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/forms/8-k.htm (last visited June
30, 2001). In the event of a foreign issuer, however, the proper form in which to
perform a Regulation FD disclosure would be a Form 6-K. See id. at §
243.101(e)(2) (2001).
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information and does not exclude any members of the public from
access."37
1.) The Parity of Information Theory
Regulation FD specifically provides that a failure to make the
required public disclosures shall not be deemed a violation of Rule
10b-5.3' However, Regulation FD reinstates, albeit under the
threat of less severe penalties, the parity of information theory
initially rejected under Rule 10b-5 by the Supreme Court.s° The
SEC justified Regulation FD on the basis of fundamental
fairness.31°
Regulation FD was also designed to prevent the use of
material nonpublic information as a commodity with which
companies reward particular analysts or favored investors.3"
Former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt described the behind-the-
scenes feeding of material information from companies to favored
individuals as a "stain on our markets.31 " As discussed above, the
SEC is entirely aware of the conflict of interest plaguing analysts
working for investment banks.3 3 In the absence of a prohibition on
307. See id. and accompanying text. For example, allowing the public
unrestricted opportunities for personal attendance at a press conference where
the material nonpublic information is initially released would satisfy the public
disclosure requirements. Attendance by the public through electronic
transmission would also be acceptable. See id.
308. See Regulation FD, supra note 136; see also 17 C.F.R. § 243.102 (2001).
309. See Karmel, supra note 127, at 3.
310. For the House of Representatives' legislative history, see H.R. REP. NO.
73-1383, at 11 (1934), reprinted in 1934 WL 1290, quoted in Regulation FD, supra
note 136, 17 C.F.R. § 243.102 (2001); H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 7 (1998),
reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, quoted in Regulation FD, supra note 136, 17
C.F.R. § 243.100-103.
311. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.101-03 (2001).
312. Paul A. Ferrillo, Manage the Risks of Regulation FD Disclosures,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 21, 2000, at 1 (citing SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, Quality
Information: The Lifeblood of Our Markets, Remarks at the Economic Club of
New York (Oct. 18, 1999), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch304.htm
(last visited Jan. 10, 2002).
313. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Laderman, Who Can You Trust? Wall Street's Spin
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selective disclosure, analysts may feel pressured to exercise self-
censorship or otherwise slant their views in favor of the companies
that they review."'
2.) Rule 10b5-1
Invoking its rulemaking authority under §10 of the Exchange
Act, the SEC adopted two other insider trading rules to
complement Regulation FD.31' The first such rule is Rule 10b5-1,
which provides for a Chinese Wall defense for insider trading
violations.3"6 Under Rule 10b5-1, a person only incurs liability for
insider trading when he purchases or sells securities while aware of
material nonpublic information."' In other words, lack of
knowledge is a defense."'
Rule 10b5-1 clarifies an uncertainty in the law. According to
the Supreme Court, liability for insider trading may attach against
an individual who trades "on" or "on the basis of" material
nonpublic information.3"9 However, the Supreme Court has not
determined whether the "use" of such information in trading
decisions is required for liability to attach, or whether "knowing
possession" while trading is enough.32
Rule 10b5-1 resolved the conflict among the circuits by bluntly
defining "trading on the basis of" material nonpublic information
as "knowing possession."32' In other words, only an investment
Game, Bus. WK., Oct. 5, 1998, at 148.
314. See id. (indicating that self-censorship would detrimentally "chill
corporate communication").
315. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.101-03 (2001).
316. See Karmel, supra note 127, at 3.
317. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.101-03 (2001).
31& See Karmel, supra note 127, at 3.
319. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983); see also United States v.
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997).
320. See Karmel, supra note 127, at 3.
321. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101-03 (2001); see also Practising Law Institute, 1204
PLI/CoRP. 113 (2000). For a discussion on the controversy over the terms "use"
and "knowing possession", see generally, L. Briley Brisendine, Securities
Regulation, 52 MERCER L. REv. 1507 (2001). The most controversial circuit cases
were United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998), United States v.
Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 1993), and SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325 (11th
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bank that maintains a Chinese Wall between the research and
underwriting aspects of its business will be able to avoid liability
for insider trading should its analysts trade or advise clients to
trade in the stock of companies it underwrites. By clarifying the
impact of the "knowing possession" of insider information, Rule
10b5-1 promotes analyst independence.
The second rule that the SEC adopted to complement
Regulation FD is Rule 10b5-2, which addresses the issue of tipping
of family members and other non-business associates by insiders."z
For purposes of establishing liability under the misappropriation
theory of insider trading, a breach of a duty of confidence or trust
must exist whenever: 1) the recipient agrees to maintain
information in confidence; 2) the recipient knows or should know
that confidentiality is expected from the history, pattern or practice
of sharing confidences between the recipient and the person
communicating the information; or 3) the recipient obtained the
information from a child, spouse, or sibling, unless it can be proved
that no duty or expectation of confidence existed.3z
3. Regulation FD in Practice
Prior to its adoption, Regulation FD was the subject of intense
debate. Its opponents argued that the regulation's impact would
be to "chill" corporate disclosures by stemming the free flow of
information to analysts. 32' Today, analysts are generally unhappy
with Regulation FD because it undercuts their influence.3" The
Security Industry Association claims that, as anticipated,
Regulation FD is "chilling the flow of information" to analysts by
eliminating the once-routine practice of companies giving special
Cir. 1998).
322. See id. It should be noted that Rule 10b5-2 is less important for thepurposes of this Article than Rule 10b5-1 and is only mentioned for the sake of
thoroughness.
323. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.101-03 (2001).
324. See Ridgway Barker, Policy Issues Alert! Regulation FD, METROPOLITAN
CORP. COUNS.., Oct. 2000, at 16.
325. See Robert Dietrich, Analysts "Hamstrung" by SEC Disclosure Rule:
Companies Simply Disclosing Less to Everyone, NAT'L POST, June 1, 2001, at
D01.
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briefings to brokerage firms." Moreover, Regulation FD allegedly
costs companies upwards of $300 million a year in compliance
costsY2
On the other hand, advocates of small investors describe
Regulation FD as a "smashing success," warning that "you'll have
people with pitchforks in the streets" if the SEC tries to overturn
or weaken it.3 ' According to a "recent survey [by the] National
Investor Relations Institute... 28% of its member companies were
providing more information to analysts and investors after [the
regulation was issued than before]. 9 Moreover, an additional 48%
have not cut back on the amount of information they provide.33
Likewise, a survey by PricewaterhouseCoopers of 160 publicly
traded companies revealed that "many [were] disclosing.., more
frequently [after Regulation FD and] that few had incurred
significant compliance costs.
331
The most profound impact of Regulation FD may be on Wall
Street culture and attitudes towards small investors. For the
foreseeable future, small investors will continue to be excluded
from road shows because, as discussed above, regular securities
offerings are typically conducted in tandem with Rule 144A and
other restricted offerings. However, Regulation FD opens the
doors for small investors to certain forums from which they have
historically been excluded. For example, in 1999, "more than
seventy-five percent of companies that held earnings conference
calls [with analysts] excluded individual investors.3 32 Today, as a
result of Regulation FD, individual investors have access to
virtually all such conference calls.3
326. See id.; see also Sara Mansard, At Hearing, Industry Cries Foul Over Fair
Disclosure: Companies, Analysts Join in Criticism, INVESTMENT NEWS, May 28,
2001, at 8.
327. See Dietrich, supra note 325, at D01.
32& See id. (quoting John Markese, president of the American Association of
Individual Investors); see also Christopher H. Schmitt, Fair Disclosure is Better
than Advertised, Bus. WK., May 7, 2001, at 66.
329. See Schmitt, supra note 328.
330. See id.
331. See id.
332. See id.
333. See id.
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B. Analyst Bias & The Internet Bust
Analysts are supposed to be experts at channeling scarce
capital into the most promising companies? During the Internet
boom, however, analysts' reports were no longer the dry
documents, rich in accounting data and small type, of yesteryear.
Instead, they often bore the breezy, salesman-like appearance of
get-rich-quick-scheme advertisements.35
For the year 2000, analysts' stock-picking performances were
generally miserable.336 A recent study that examined 168,281
ratings from analysts in 213 financial firms found that highly
recommended stocks under-performed the market by 31%, while
the least recommended stocks outperformed the market by 49%.337
Moreover, even as Internet stock values were imploding, a survey
by Thomson Financial found that during December 2000, 71% of
all analyst recommendations were "buy," 27% were "hold," and
only 2% were "sell.0 3 1
Indeed, the new economy broke all rules of traditional finance.
Companies went public with no dividends or promise of dividends,
no profits, and even sometimes without revenue projections.339
334. See Elstrom, supra note 2, at EB16 (discussing the abandonment by
financial firms of proven investment strategies during the Internet boom).
335. See Tully, Betrayal on Wall Street, supra note 18 (describing the Internet
boom as a con game); see also Rhonda Schaffler, Market Call: Tough Call: Ethical
Practice of Wall Street Analysts under Congressional Scrutiny (CNNFn television
broadcast, June 15, 2001) (interview with financial writer Benjamin Mark Cole
discussing recent Congressional hearings, the conflicts of interest inherent in
financial analysts' recommendations, and the need for reform). In one
commentator's words, "[t]he Chinese wall that once separated investment
banking from research is deader than the Berlin Wall right now." Matthew
Benjamin, Financial Advice you Can Trust, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 25,
2001, at 36 (discussing the lack of objective information available to investors
from analysts and the need for reform).
336. See Breaking Point for U.S. Brokers, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REv., June 19,
2001, at 62 (discussing how conflicts of interest led to poor stock picking
performance and the industry's attempt at self regulation in the face of
Congressional hearings).
337. Id.
338. Toedtman, supra note 2, at A63; see also Testimony by Dalmon Silvers,
supra note 237.
339. See Michael Loh, Why Did Dotcoms Crash?, Bus. TIMES SINGAPORE,
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During the boom, investors prodded by Wall Street forecasts,
dangerously equated the theoretical possibilities of new
technologies with the real-world math of financial markets." On
December 16, 1998, an analyst at CIBC Oppenheimer predicted
that the shares of Amazon.com, then at $242.75, would reach $400
within a year.41 At the time, Amazon.com was losing ninety cents
a share, and had never turned a profit.3"" Nonetheless, the price of
Amazon.com stock shot up $46.25 in a single day on the strength of
that announcement, and traded at a split-adjusted price of nearly
$600 one year later.343
At its highest valuation in the spring of 1999, Amazon.com was
valued at an astounding $33 billion.' To put this in perspective,
Amazon.com, which in 1999 lost $720 million from $1.6 billion in
revenues,345 was worth approximately as much as General Motors,
which that year earned $5.6 billion in profits from $176.5 billion in
revenues.' To reach that valuation, Amazon.com's share price
appreciated more than 4,000% since its IPO in May 1997."47
Assuming a somewhat generous price/earnings multiple of twenty,
Amazon.com's peak valuation would have normally been justified
for a company with net yearly profits in excess of $1.5 billion, not
for a business that was producing greater losses each quarter."
May 29, 2001, at 25.
340. See Lewitt, supra note 1, at 41 (describing the valuation theories
employed to value Internet companies as flawed).
341. T.K. Maloy, Dumb Moments in E-Business History, UNITED PRESS INT'L,
Apr. 13, 2001.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. International Tip: Amazon.com, INVESTOR'S CHRON., May 18, 2001, at 81
(evaluating the Amazon.com's value in April 1999).
345. Amazon.com Expects Pro Forma Operating Profitability in Fourth
Quarter 2001, Bus. WIRE, Jan. 30, 2001; see also Ignore Sectors, Buy Stocks:
Investors Stampede in and out of Market They Don't Know, NAT'L POST, Apr. 19,
2001.
346. Seee also Bethany McLean, Introducing the FORTUNE Stock Indexes;
The Fortune 500 Index and the Fortune e-50 Index Represent the Size, Strength,
and Amazing Inventiveness of American Business, FORTUNE, Mar. 6, 2000, at 130.
347. Levi Folk & Richard Webb, Is It E-Business - or Is It E-Bubble? Mutual
Funds, TORONTO STAR, July 14, 1999, at Bus.
348. Lewitt, supra note 1, at 41 n.11.
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1. The "New" Economy
As discussed above, some type of valuation method is
necessary to get at least an initial estimate of the price at which
IPO shares should be offered. A stock's price is generally a
function of current earnings and anticipated growth of future
earnings. 9 Most Internet companies, however, exhibited zero or
negative earnings when they sought a first round of financing from
Wall Street.35 Moreover, growth of earnings is usually estimated
with reference to the industry as a whole.351 Internet companies,
however, were pioneering a relatively novel technology, with no
industry track record against which to estimate earnings.352
Technology experts soon stepped in to offer their advice on
the subject of valuation. For "new economy" theorists in Wall
Street and Silicon Valley, the Internet was so revolutionary it
justified the suspension of the traditional rules of corporate
finance.353 Due to the "network effect," '354 the "law of accelerating
returns, 355 and the "microcosm" '356 nature of the Internet, the
349. McCarthy, supra note 138.
350. See id.
351. See id.
352. See id.
353. See Lewitt, supra note 1, at 41.
354. "The network effect holds that the value of a single component of a
network (like a fax machine or a PC) increases with the number of components
in the network." Id. For example, a PC-compatible computer is more valuable
than a non-PC compatible computer because there are more PC-compatible
computers than non-PC compatible computers. See id. Therefore, PC-
compatible computers can communicate with more computers and have access to
a wider diversity of software and services than non-PC compatible computers.
See id.
355. Ray Kurzweil explains "the law of accelerating returns" as follows -
Technology is the continuation of evolution by other means, and is itself an
evolutionary process. So it, too, speeds up. A primary reason that evolution - of
life-forms or of technology - speeds up is that it builds on its own increasing
order... the evolutionary process of technology seeks to improve capabilities in
an exponential fashion. Innovation is multiplicative, not additive. Technology,
like any evolutionary process, builds on itself.
RAY KURZWEIL, THE AGE OF SPIRITUAL MACHINES: WHEN COMPUTERS
EXCEED HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 32 (1999).
356. According to George Gilder, "[i]n the microcosm, the cost of fuel and
materials declines drastically; the expense devolves from matter to mind. Just as
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possibilities for profit from investing in Internet-related companies
were boundless."
Furthermore, deepening losses should not distract investors
from focusing on market share. According to W. Brian Arthur, a
leading technology expert -
Not only do the costs of producing high-technology products
fall as a company makes more of them, but the benefits of using
them increase. Many items such as computers or
telecommunications equipment work in networks that require
compatibility; when one brand gains a significant market share,
people have a strong incentive to buy more of the same product
so as to be able to exchange information with those using it
already.358
It followed that marketing expenses of any magnitude were
justified. Some theorists went so far as to claim that the New
Economy was immune from the traditional boom-bust rules of
economic gravity. New Economy guru Kevin Kelly, in his book
The New Rules for the New Economy, described the coming
Internet Age as follows -
Communications is the foundation of society, of our culture, of
our humanity, of our individual identity, and of all economic
systems. This is why networks are such a big deal.
Communication is so close to culture and society itself that the
effects of technologizing it are beyond the scale of mere
industrial-sector cycle. Communication, and its ally computers,
is a special case in economic history. Not because it happens to
be the fashionable leading business sector of our day, but
because its cultural, technological, and conceptual impacts
reverberate at the root of our lives.5
quantum science overthrew Newtonian matter in the explanation of the universe,
the quantum economy overthrows Newtonian matter in the creation of wealth."
GEORGE GILDER, MICROCOSM: THE QUANTUM REVOLUTION IN ECONOMICS
AND TECHNOLOGY 30 (1989).
357. See id.
358. W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCY IN
THE ECONOMY 3-4 (1994).
359. KEVIN KELLY, NEW RULES FOR THE NEW ECONOMY: 10 RADICAL
STRATEGIES FOR A CONNECTED WORLD 5 (1998).
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The traditional rules for determining the price of the stock of a
company would have vetted financing for many Internet upstarts.
Instead of discriminating between upstarts, Wall Street engaged in
the wholesale adoption of new and unproven valuation models.
Losses were disregarded, and analysts instead focused on revenue
growth, industry leadership, and projected profitability to establish
pricing benchmarks.3" Some Wall Street analysts adopted even
more dubious valuation methods based on hazy and empirically
unsupported concepts such as "multiples of revenue," "scalability,"
or "visibility."36' Inflated and unreliable revenue and cash flow
projections were extrapolated up to the sky based on elegant,
absurd, or entirely optimistic theories.362
a. Boo.com
One of the most memorable business failures of the Internet
boom involves Boo.com and its attempt to become the world's
premier Internet fashion-retailer, as well as "the first truly global e-
tailer, with world-wide sales, marketing and distribution
capabilities."3 '3 To this end, Boo.com used a three dimensional,
graphics-intensive website with a virtual changing room that
allowed customers to virtually "try on" clothes and view them from
every angle.3" The site conducted business in seven languages and
quoted prices in eighteen currencies.365 However, it took the
company an entire five months after having already begun an
intensive advertising campaign to finally launch its website, and
when it was finally launched, it was riddled with many glitches and
360. See McCarthy, supra note 138.
361. See Lewitt, supra note 1, at 41.
362 See id.
363. Erik Portanger & Stephanie Gruner, Boo.com Holders Put Site on the
Block Amid Doubts Over Ability to Raise Cash, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2000, at B6;
see also Avis de temp~te sur Boo.com, LE MONDE , Jan. 24, 2001.
364. See Christopher Cooper & Erik Portanger, Spooked: Money Men Liked
Boo and Boo Liked Money; Then It All Went Poof; Flashy Web Site for Clothes
Had Lots of Cool Ideas, Few Financial Controls, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2000, at
Al.
365. Id.
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complicated technical difficulties, making it practically unusable.3"
In a period of only eighteen months, Boo managed to burn
through $185 million in venture capital financing.36 Investment
banks such as Goldman Sachs and J.P. Morgan had raised much of
that money from private investors, and additional funding was
expected.6  However, before J.P. Morgan could launch the
planned IPO, Boo had become the object of media ridicule and
was hopelessly insolvent.369
All losses considered, Boo blew a cool $200 million in only one
and a half years.37° Where did so much money go so quickly? A lot
of money went into advertising. For instance, in 1999, Boo hired a
prestigious London ad agency and projected a two-year $65 million
advertising budget.3' Boo also spent lavishly on parties and
employee perks, such as five-star hotels and first class travel to
attend fashion shows in Paris and Milan.372 Almost overnight the
staff ballooned from five to two hundred. 3  Despite such
considerable marketing expenditures, Boo was only able to
generate a paltry $380,000 in revenues during its first operating
quarter.3 4 In a desperate attempt to move inventory, Boo
366. See Erik Portanger & Stephanie Gruner, Boo.com to Move into
Receivership as Funds Dry Up, WALL ST. J., May 18, 2000, at B16; see also Cate
T. Corcoran, More than Style, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2000, at R68.
367. See David P. Hamilton & Mylene Mangalindan, Angels of Death: Reality
Bites Hard as Strings of Dot.coms Sees Funding Drying Up; Venture Capitalists
Get Tougher on E-Losers; Operative Term is Triage; Hanging by a Green Threat,
WALL ST. J., May 25, 2000, at Al; see also Paul Kedroisky, When Dot.com Kids
Get too Much Money: Internet Blow-ups Discredit Clueless Owners, Not the Net,
NAT'L POST, May 20, 2000; Andrew Ross Sorkin, From Big Idea to Big Bust; The
Wild Ride of Boo.com, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2000, at 3.
368. See Cooper & Portanger, supra note 365, at Al.
369. Id.; see also, e.g., Paul Kedroisky, supra note 367, at Dl; It's Strategy;
What's Dumb Is Dumb, No Matter How Much Technology It Uses, FIN.
DIRECTOR, Oct. 19, 2000, at 53.
370. 2000: The Year of the Dot-Bomb, Bus. WK., Jan. 15,2001, at 10.
371. Sarah Ellison, Boo.com: Buried by Badly Managed Buzz, WALL ST. J.,
May 23, 2000, at B10.
372. See Karlion Lillington, Dust Settles on Dot.com Hype, Venture Capitalists
and Investors Have Become More Cautious Amid High-Profile Failures, IRISH
TIMEs, June 2, 2000, at 59; see also Cooper & Portanger, supra note 365, at Al.
373. Sorkin, supra note 367, at 3.
374. Kerry Capell, Boo.com Is Getting Downright Scary, Bus. WK., May 22,
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discounted its merchandise by 40% or more.75
At the Boo.corn liquidation sale, an online-shopping portal
paid about $400,000 for Boo.com's domain names, trademarks, and
other assets (including the special Boo font, 40,000 giveaway Boo
Frisbees, as well as Boo's sexy digital mascot, Miss Boo). 76
Another company snapped up its software and ninety technology
employees for $378,000. 377
b. Pets.corn
Pets.com, Inc is another much-celebrated casualty of the
Internet bust.7  Pointedly, pet supplies have never been a
particularly lucrative business, with razor-thin margins of around
2%. Moreover, bags of dog food are heavy, and cannot be
delivered to customers cheaply.3" Indeed, the larger Pets.com
revenues grew, the more money it lost.
31
2000, at 22.
375. Id.
376. Stephanie Gruner, Web Failure Boo.com Gets a New Lease on Life as a
Unit of Fashionmall. com, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2000, at B8.
377. Konstantin Richter, Job Market Welcomes Boo.com Employees; Knowing
What Can Go Wrong Proves Attractive to Recruiters, WALL ST. J., June 14, 2000.
378. Although over 130 dot-coms folded in 2000, the failure of Pets.com was
one of the more memorable - and not just because of its famous Sock Puppet
mascot, a floppy-eared dog with a spot over one eye featured in many TV
commercials. See Pui-Wing Tam & Mylene Mangalindan, Pet-Supply Site Sought
Money but Couldn't Find Backers; 'It's Sad,' Says the Founder, WALL ST. J., Nov.
8, 2000, at Bi; see also Katharine Mieszkowski, The Glory Days of E-Commerce
Are Over, SALON.COM, Nov. 29, 2000, available at
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2000/11/29/ecommerce/index.html (last visited
Jan. 23, 2002).
379. Arlene Weintraub & Robert D. Hof, For Online Pet Stores, It's Dog-Eat-
Dog, Bus. WK., Mar. 6, 2000, at 78.
380. See id.
381. In fact, the business plan of Pets.com has been variously described as
"dumb" or "stupid," with one commentator suggesting that it would have been a
good thing if "Fido had just chewed it up from the start." See Michael Liedtke,
Dot.coMs Can Provide Some Dumb Ideas, CHATTANOOGA TIMES, Dec. 24, 2000,
at G2; see also Weintraub & Hof, supra note 379, at 78 (noting that the company
was not making a profit); cf. Mieszkowski, supra note 378 (describing dot-corn
business plans as "stupid").
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Pets.com started operations in February 1999.382 By the end of
1999, the company had $5.8 million in sales, having spent $55.3
million to sell goods costing the company $13.4 million, as it sought
to "increase market share" (as its offering prospectus delicately put
it).3' Pet.com's dismal track record did not discourage Merrill
Lynch from taking the company public."' The February 2000 IPO
raised an additional $66 million for Pets.com.3"5 Ten months later,
the company closed its doors.386
In its brief eighteen-month existence, Pets.com accumulated
$147 million in losses.3" Shortly before the company finally shut
down, its stock stood at twenty-two cents a share, a long way down
from its $11 offering price or the $14 price the stock reached
shortly after its first day of trading."8 Analysts for Merrill Lynch,
however, had gleefully pumped up the stock throughout its
downward trajectory. Henry Blodget, "Wall Street's loudest
cheerleader of Internet stocks""3 9 and an analyst with Merrill Lynch
at the time, issued a buy recommendation when the stock hit $16."
When the stock fell to $7, Blodget reaffirmed his buy rating, and
again when the stock dropped to $2, and then again when it
dropped to $1.69.391 When the stock hit $1.43, Blodget told
investors to "accumulate."3" Henry Blodget has since become the
382 2000: The Year of the Dot-Bomb, Bus. WK., Jan. 15, 2001, at 10.
383. Jonathan Weil, Did Accountants Fail to Flag Problems at Dot.com
Casualties?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2001.
384. Howard Kurtz, Who Blew the Dot.com Bubble, WASH. POST, Mar. 12,
2001, at Col.
385. Elstrom, supra note 2, at EB16.
386. Id.
387. See Reed Abelson, Pets.com, Sock Puppet's Home, Will Close, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 8, 2000, at 4.
388. Id.; see also Tam & Mangalindan, supra note 378, at B1.
389. Kurtz, supra note 384, at C01 (explaining that while Henry Blodget was
virtually canonized during the dot-corn boom, he is now one of many analysts to
be vilified for the Internet stocks' downfall).
390. Scott Pelley, Wall Street Prophets; Stock Analysts for Big Brokerage
Houses Analyzing a Company and Recommending Whether to Buy a Stock that
Makes Them Rich and Not You, CBS NEWS TRANSCRIPTS, June 26, 2001.
391. Id.
392. Id.
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target of lawsuits by disgruntled investors.393
C. A New Wall for Wall Street
Under both NYSE and NASD rules, reports issued by analysts
during or shortly after a public offering must disclose any
involvement of the analyst's employer in the offering as an
underwriter.94 However, under the Supreme Court's decision in
Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, a simple failure to disclose
bias or motivation may be insufficient to support a cause of action
under Rule 10b-5.395 As mentioned above, however, the SEC has
broad powers to issue disclosure rules. The SEC could, for
example, amend Regulation FD to require analysts to disclose
potential bias.
Indeed, the financial services industry is under intense
pressure to take preventive action and forestall the recurrence of
certain practices common during the Internet boom. "Less than 48
hours before [congressional] hearings, the Securities Industry
Association and 14 major investment banks recently [took a stab at
self-regulation by issuing] a list of Best Practices for Research."'396
The main thrust of that publication involves rules that bar
researchers from reporting to bankers, analysts from trading
against their stock recommendations, and banks from tying
compensation to specific deals. 97 According to the Best Practices
report, analysts should always exhibit objective and independent
judgment, and should promote the best interests of investors,
393. See, e.g., Mark Davis, How Impartial an Analyst? Investors Call for
Greater Disclosure of Financial Experts' Potential Conflicts, KAN. CITY STAR,
Aug. 12, 2001, at F1l.
394. See McLaughlin, supra note 231.
395. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991) (holding that
liability under the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rules requires more than
"proof of mere disbelief or undisclosed motivation.").
396. Megan Barnett, New Wall for Wall Street, INDUS. STANDARD, June 25,
2001; SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, BEST PRACTICES FOR RESEARCH
(2001), available at
www.sia.com/pdf/BestPracticesF.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2001)[hereinafter Best
Practices for Research].
397. See id.
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rather than IPO candidates.398 Importantly, the Best Practices
report calls for analysts to disclose involvement by their employer
in IPOs of the companies that they cover.399 By its nature,
unfortunately, the guidelines of the Best Practices report are
exhortative rather than mandatory.'
IV. THE MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY AND THE IPO ALLOCATION
RULES
A. The GLG Partners and Chelsey Capital Investigation
Analyst independence created problems during the Internet
boom that cannot be properly appreciated without discussing IPO
allocation. As previously discussed, analysts employed
overoptimistic IPO forecasts to inflate the demand for stocks of
questionable value. Then, prior to the public offering,
underwriters gave blocks of intentionally underrated stock to
favored clients. These shares experienced a predictable pop on the
first day of trading, and the clients, usually institutional investors
such as mutual funds, flipped them for quick profit. The client
then gave a "kickback" to the underwriter by doing more trading
business with the underwriter's bank, which increased the bank's
lucrative trading revenues.
In an all too typical kind case, the SEC is investigating two
little-known mutual funds, GLG Partners ("GLG") and Chelsey
Capital ("Chelsey"), for receiving oversized IPO allocations of
shares of VA Linux Systems." The shares went public at $30 and
closed that same day at $239.25, for an almost immediate 697.5%
gain for those individuals or institutions fortunate enough to have
398. See id. (stating that with respect to conflict of interest, "research
employees should always put customer interests ahead of personal investments").
399. See id. (noting that when a firm takes a company public and a member of
the firm's analyst team has a stake in the company, that fact should be disclosed).
400. See id.
401. Randall Smith, SEC Probes Two Funds' Role in IPO Stakes, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 8, 2001, at Cl (detailing the SEC investigation into Wall Street firms that
received high trading commissions in exchange for doling out "slices of coveted
IPOs.").
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been allocated shares in the IPO by its underwriter.' In exchange
for the coveted IPO shares, GLG and Chelsey may have paid
kickbacks in the form of unusually large trading commissions to
Credit Suisse First Boston ("CSFB"), which underwrote the VA
Linux offering.' 3
GLG and Chelsey received 35,000 shares and 15,000 shares,
respectively, and earned profits of $7.3 million and $3.1 million
respectively by flipping the shares the first day of trading.' Over
the next few days, the mutual funds engaged CSFB to handle
enormous trades in unrelated securities, with commission rates of
"20 times the going rate for institutional investors." 5 An internal
investigation at CSFB revealed that some of its brokers might have
pressured the mutual funds into paying the excessive commissions
in exchange for an allocation of the IPO shares.' CSFB fired
three brokers, all of whom were supervised by Frank Quattrone.'
Quattrone is the famed securities analyst and investment banker
with a $100 million-a-year compensation package who had a key
role in launching many of the Internet IPOs in the 1990s. °8
During the Internet boom, CSFB underwrote 186 IPOs,
more than any other investment bank in the world.' However,
402- Id.
403. Id.
404. Id. By contrast, "some of the largest mutual fund groups in the U.S.",
whose assets significantly exceed those of the two mutual funds involved in the
probe, such as Alliance Capital Management and AIM Management Group,
received comparatively paltry allocations of between 60,000 and 75,000 shares.
See id.
405. Id.
406. See Randall Smith & Susan Pulliam, Deals & Deal Makers: CSFB Says It
Has Fired 3 Brokers, WALL ST. J., June 29,2001, at Cl.
407. Id.
408. Matt Beer, Lawmen Pick Through Dot.com Wreckage for Wrongdoing,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 9, 2001 (noting that in addition, Frank Quattrone
was under an SEC probe for illegal IPO related activities); see also Duncan
Hughes, Buy or Sell? Just Ignore the "Experts," SUNDAY Bus., May 6, 2001, at 16
(stating that Quattrone and his fellow "independent" analysts have recently come
under fire from critics for having a cozy relationship with their investment
banking colleagues and the companies they were taking to the market).
409. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Just Who Brought Those Duds to Market?, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 15, 2001 at § 3, p. 1.
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twenty-five of the companies CSFB brought public, representing
$133.8 million in revenues for the bank, traded for less than $1 per
share as of April 2001.* ° Yet, CSFB analysts continued to release
optimistic recommendations." For the first quarter of 2001, the
forty stocks with "buy" recommendations from CSFB analysts
showed a net loss, compared to a modest 14% return for those
stocks with "sell" recommendations.
4 12
The VA Linux incident may cost CSFB and those individuals
involved dearly. According to a class action filed by small
investors, "Credit Suisse solicited and received additional,
excessive and undisclosed commissions from certain investors, in
exchange for which it allocated to those investors material portions
of the restricted number of Linux shares issued in connection with
the offering. 4 13 This was a violation of the terms of the offering
prospectus and there is a possibility of criminal charges.4 14 The
SEC has added eight attorneys to its Silicon Valley staff. 5 The
U.S. Attorney's Office has added seven attorneys to its securities
fraud unit in Silicon Valley, up from zero in 1999.416 As one Silicon
Valley gossip columnist quipped, "[f]or me, the high-tech beat is
now a crime beat.,
417
410. Id.
411. See Hughes, supra note 408, at 16 (noting that investment banks continue
to recommend Internet stocks such as Yahoo! and Amazon.com despite huge
falls in the prices of both stocks).
412 Id. As previously discussed, the disparity between analyst
recommendations and stock performance is not unique to CSFB. For example,.
investors who had followed each of the seven "strong buy" recommendations
issued by Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Internet analysts in early 2000 would have
watched their portfolio implode with 100% losses. See Hughes, supra note 408,
at 16.
413. Conal Walsh, Net Closes on the Hi-tech Superbankers: US Firms Behind
Internet Floats Face a Grand Jury Inquiry into Corruption on Share Allocations,
OBSERVER, May 20, 2001, at 8.
414. See id. (stating that in addition to possible criminal charges, and SEC
inquiries, the NASD is also questioning several of Quattrone's colleagues).
415. Beer, supra note 408.
416. Id.
417. Id.
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B. IPO Allocation Rules
Institutional investors are intermediaries between the issuer
and long-term investors - they routinely flip their IPO allocations
soon after the offering, imposing an added cost and an unnecessary
burden on the capital formation system.4 18 Nonetheless, the IPO
allocation rules focus less on inefficiency and waste than on the
gross unfairness of who is receiving a hot IPO. 19 However, the
rules do not require that hot IPOs be allocated equitably or on a
first-come, first-serve basis."' °
1. The NASD Free-Riding and Withholding Interpretation
The NASD requires members to observe, in the conduct of
their business, "high standards of commercial honor and just and
equitable principles of trade.0 2' Accordingly, the NASD has long
prohibited NASD members and their affiliated persons from
participating in hot IPOs.' The applicable NASD standard is the
"Free-Riding and Withholding" Interpretation (the
"Interpretation"), which is based on the premise that underwriters
have an ethical obligation to make a bona fide distribution of
418. See Coffee, The IPO Allocation Probe: Who Is the Victim?, supra note 14,
at 6. Because institutional investors regularly 'flip' the shares they buy in IPOs
within days or weeks of the offering, they are as much a link in the transmission
pipeline between the issuer and the ultimate long-term investor as is the
underwriter. See id. Hence, to this extent, underpricing typically benefits neither
the issuer nor the long-term investor, but is rather a cost imposed on capital
formation, which accrues to financial intermediaries. See id.
419. See id.
420. See id.
421. Standards of Commercial Honor and Principles of Trade, NASD
Conduct Rule IM-2110, NASD Conduct Rule IM-2110-1 [hereinafter NASD
Conduct Rule 2110], reprinted in GILDARDO MICHEL-GARCIA, ESQ. NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF SECURITY DEALERS (NASD) RULES 0100-3420 57, available at
www.burreau.qc.ca/congres/2001/pdf/19-garcia-manual.pdf (last visited Dec. 23,
2001).
422 See Coffee, The IPO Allocation Probe: Who Is the Victim?, supra note 14,
at 6, n.4 ("The NASD has long had a policy restricting the sale by NASD
members of securities in public offerings to accounts in which 'restricted persons'
have a beneficial interest.").
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public offerings trading at a premium.4' Under the Interpretation,
hot IPOs include any securities offering that trades at a premium in
the aftermarket, regardless of magnitude.42' No sales of such
securities may be made to "any officer, director, general partner,
employee or agent of the member or any other broker/dealer, or to
a member of the immediate family of any such person.""
Moreover, the underwriter and members of the underwriting team
not registered with NASD may not retain hot IPO shares in their
personal accounts.'
The Interpretation also prevents an investment bank from
turning allocations of hot IPOs into bribes to improve future
underwriting or trading revenues for the investment bank.4' It also
prohibits allocations to so-called finders, or individuals whose
professional duties give them enhanced access to young companies
on the verge of going public.4" Likewise, allocations of hot IPOs to
individuals who manage large blocks of stocks for third parties, and
who may be expected to regularly direct large-volume trades, are
also prohibited.429
Section 15A of the Exchange Act, authorizes the NASD to
promulgate rules to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and
practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade, and to
protect investors and the public interest.' These rules can be
enforced by penalties that range from limitation of NASD related
423. See NASD Free Riding and Withholding Interpretation, supra note 162,
at IM-2110-1.
424. See id. at IM-2110-1(a).
425. Id. at IM-2110-1(b)(2).
426. See id. at IM-2110-1(b)(1).
427. See id.
42& See id. at IM-2110-1(b)(3).
429. See id. at IM-2110-1(b)(4).
430. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3. Section 15A(b)(6) of the Exchange Act requires -
(6) The rules of the association [must be] designed to prevent fraudulent and
manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of
trade, to foster cooperation and coordination with persons engaged in
regulating, clearing, settling, processing information with respect to, and
facilitating transactions in securities, to remove impediments to and perfect the
mechanism of a free and open market and a national market system, and, in
general, to protect investors and the public interest ....
15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6).
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activities to expulsion31
The Interpretation is an interpretation of NASD Conduct Rule
2110 and simply states, "[a] member.., shall observe high
standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of
trade." 32 The NASD recently filed a proposal with the SEC to
make this interpretation a rule. This rule should raise the profile of
the NASD's position on the subject of improper IPO allocation.433
2. Pro vosed NASD Rule 2790
In fall 1999, the NASD presented Rule 2790, a new rule
proposal to replace the Free-Riding and Withholding
Interpretation. '  The new rule should facilitate enforcement by
releasing from supervision certain activities that posed only minor
regulatory concerns. '35 On the other hand, some of the changes
that the new rule introduces are not so welcome.
Rule 2790 will continue to prohibit the practice of allocating
IPO units as a "reward" to individuals in a position to direct future
business to a member firm. '36 However, unlike its predecessor,
431. Specifically, Section 15A(b)(b)(7) of the Exchange Act provides -(7) The rules of the association [must] provide that (subject to any rule or
order of the Commission pursuant to section 17(d) or 19(g)(2) of this title [15
U.S.C. §§ 78q(d), 78s(g)(2)] its members and persons associated with its
members shall be appropriately disciplined for violation of any provision of this
title, the rules or regulations thereunder, the rules of the Municipal Securities
Rulemaking Board, or the rules of the association, by expulsion, suspension,
limitation of activities, functions, and operations, fine, censure, being suspended
or barred from being associated with a member, or any other fitting sanction.
Id.
432. NASD Conduct Rule 2110, supra note 421; see also Singer Frumento
LLP, NASD Finally Proposes a Free-Riding and Withholding Rule, SEC. INDUS.
COMMENTATOR, available at www.singerfru.com/SIC/1999/q499/frwprop.html
(last visited Jan. 15, 2002).
433. See Dennis C. Hensley & Barbara J. Endres, NASD Proposes to
Overhaul its Free Riding and Withholding Interpretation, 15 INSIGHTS 2 (2001).
434. See NASD Board of Governors Approves Rule Proposal for Trading in
Hot Equity Offerings, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 7, 1999.
435. See generally, NASD Rule on Trading in Hot Equity Offerings, CLIENT
ALERT INVESTMENT MGMT. & FIN. MARKETS GROUP (Bell, Boyd & Lloyd LLC,
Chicago, 11.), Jan. 28, 2000, available at
http://www.bellboyd.com/newsletters/HotEquity.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2001).
436. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by the National
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Rule 2790 is purportedly designed to deter some of the chicanery
that took place during the Internet boom.37 In general, the latest
amended version of Rule 2790 provides that -
(1) A member or a person associated with a member may not
sell, or cause to [sell,] be sold, a [hot] new issue [in a public
offering] to any account in which a restricted person [or a
member of the restricted person's immediate family] has a
beneficial interest, except as otherwise permitted herein [or
through an exemption pursuant to the Rule 9600 Series].
(2) A member or a person associated with a member may not
purchase a [hot issues acquired in a public offering except as
permitted herein or through an exception pursuant to the Rule
9600 Series. [sic]] new issue in any account in which such a
member or person associate [sic] with a member has a
beneficial interest, except as otherwise permitted herein.
(3) A member may not continue to hold [hot issues acquired in
a public offering except as permitted herein or through an
exception pursuant to the Rule 9600 Series. [sic]] new issues
acquired by the member as an underwriter, selling group
member, or otherwise, except as otherwise permitted herein.43'
A key distinction between the Interpretation and Rule 2790 is
in their scopes. The Interpretation covers hot issues, which are
defined as new issues that experience an aftermarket premium,
regardless of that premium's magnitude. By contrast, Rule 2790
eliminates the notion of hot issues.1'1 It covers all new issues (i.e.,
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Trading in Hot Equity
Offerings, Securities Exchange Act Release 34,42325, 65 F.R. 2656, 2658 (Jan. 18,
2000) [hereinafter Rule 2790 Amendment No. 1].
437. See Siconolfi, supra note 28, at C16.
438. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc., Relating to Trading in Hot Equity Offerings, Securities
Exchange Act Release 34,43627, 65 F.R. 76,316 (Dec. 6, 2000) [hereinafter Rule
2790 Amendment No. 2].
439. See Hensley & Endres, supra note 433, (noting that the proposed
amendment applies to most initial equity public offerings, not just to the "hot"
issues).
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most IPOs of equity securities), not just hot issues.'0
Rule 2790 affords broker-dealers with greater certainty of
compliance in structuring their IPO allocations." Under the
Interpretation, a broker-dealer has to cancel any sales to a
restricted person prior to the first business day if an offering
unexpectedly trades at a premium in the aftermarket. "2 Rule 2790
would place a blanket restriction on holdings of new issue
securities by broker-dealers or their associated persons in any
account in which they may have a beneficial ownership interest."3
The Interpretation contains a comparable restriction.4" However,
Rule 2790 introduces new record keeping requirements that would
allow broker-dealers to certify that they have not sold any new
issues to a restricted person." As a precondition to sale, the
broker-dealer must obtain a representation from the prospective
customer that no restricted person has a beneficial interest in the
account into which a new issue will be sold.'  These
representations must be updated at least annually."7
Another difference is the broader definition of "beneficial
interest" in Rule 2790. The Interpretation contains a relatively
narrow definition of beneficial interest. Conversely, Rule 2790
applies to "any economic interest," whether direct or indirect,
including the right to share in collective gains or losses." The
proposed rule also carves out an exemption for management fees(also known as performance fees), based on operating a collective
investment account."9 As discussed below, the restrictions in Rule
2790 generally do not apply to allocations to investment funds.
Although allocations to investment fund managers in their
440. See Rule 2790 Amendment No. 2, supra note 438, at 76,316.
441. See Hensley & Endres, supra note 433.
442 See NASD Free Riding and Withholding Interpretation, supra note 162,
at IM-2110-1(a)(3).
443. See Hensley & Endres, supra note 433.
444. NASD Free Riding and Withholding Interpretation, supra note 162, at
IM-2110-1(a)(1).
445. See Rule 2790 Amendment No. 2, supra note 438, at 76,316.
446. See id.
447. Hensley & Endres, supra note 433.
448. See Rule 2790 Amendment No. 2, supra note 438, at 76,316.
449. Id.
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personal capacity are banned, allocations to the investment funds
that they manage are unrestricted under the exemption.
Nonetheless, in regards to deterring abuses of the IPO
allocation process, the management or performance fees
exemption seems improper. The soaring valuations of dot-coin
stocks during the Internet boom had a direct effect on Wall Street
compensation, boosting salaries across the board.50 Yet, most of
the increases took the shape of annual bonuses - which rewarded
robust underwriting and trading revenues, as well as inflated short-
term market valuations."' For example, the typical managing
director made $2 million in 2000, with a base salary of only
$200,000 to $250,000.452
Under the proposed rule, an allocation of a substantial block
of hot IPO units to an investment fund can directly affect the
compensation level of the fund's manager and employees. The
management and performance fees exemption to Rule 2790
thereby undermines the statutory restrictions and reinforces the
potential impact of hot IPO allocations as a commercial bribe.
Another problem with Rule 2790 is that it narrows the
definition of a restricted person.53 As currently drafted, Rule 2790
would apply uniformly to all broker-dealers, including foreign
("other") broker-dealers. '  Yet at the same time, the proposed
rule only restricts IPO allocations to "portfolio" managers, or
personnel who have "the authority to make investment
decisions." 55 This restriction seems to disregard the pressures on a
portfolio manager by a financial institution.
Rule 2790 also continues the policies of the Interpretation with
respect to institutional buyers. 6 IPO allocation restrictions under
Rule 2790 do not expressly apply to investment companies
registered under the Investment Company Act, collective
450. See Michael McDonald, Pay Envelopes Swell for Execs, Managers;
Benefits, Perks Also on the Rise; Hourly Workers Not Faring as Well, CRAIN'S
N.Y. Bus., Aug. 28, 2000, at 3.
451. See id.
452 See id.
453. See Hensley & Endres, supra note 433.
454. See Rule 2790 Amendment No. 2, supra note 438, at 76,318-19.
455. See id. at 76,319.
456. See Hensley & Endres, supra note 433.
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investment accounts involving one thousand or more trust accounts
or policyholders, or publicly traded corporations.457 The rationale
seems to be that IPO allocations made to these investment vehicles
ultimately reach the public because they are open to public
participation." However, as discussed above, the IPO allocation
problem is not just one of fairness, but of the efficiency with which
our capital markets operate.
Institutional buyers are key to the success of an IPO. '59
Potentially, institutional buyers have the resources to purchase
large blocks of stock and maintain an orderly secondary market.
However, IPO allocation mechanisms could be devised to preserve
the participation of institutional buyers in IPOs without injuring
the efficiency of the capital markets. Rule 2790 could require that
underwriters allocate scarce IPO units pro rata, according to the
value of market orders.
For example, assume that there are one hundred IPO units,
and that individuals A, B, and C and institutional investor XYZ
place market orders for one hundred, two hundred, three hundred,
and one thousand units respectively. There are a total of 1,600
market orders for an IPO that only consists of one hundred units;
the IPO is oversubscribed by a ratio of 16:1. A pro rata allocation
would entitle A to 6.25, or 100 0 0 u1  i (as1600 mingthat
fractional shares are possible). Similarly, % would receive 12.5
units, while C would receive 18.75 units and XYZ would receive
62.5 units. Mandatory pro rata allocation of new issues has the
advantage of reducing the incentives an underwriter has to
purposely under-price IPOs.
As an alternative, IPOs could be distributed according to the
Dutch auction system." Under that system, an oversubscribed
stock would go to the highest bidder, and not to the underwriter's
preferred customer." This approach, pioneered by W. R.
457. See Rule 2790 Amendment No. 2, supra note 438, at 76,317.
458. See Coffee, 'Spinning'for Dollars, supra note 27.
459. See McCune, supra note 56, at 23 ("The success of an IPO stems from the
number of large institutional investors that buy in.").
460. See Coffee, IPO Underpricing and Dutch Auctions, supra note 158
(positing that "[i[n] an efficient, frictionless world.. .[i]ssuers would turn to a
Dutch Auction format to sell their stock to the highest bidder").
461. See id.
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Hambrecht & Co., would create "greater value for the issuer while
also chilling the incentive" to under-price the IPO or to "flip"
shares in the aftermarket. 2
Different variations of a Dutch auction system could be
established. For example, Hambrecht's "openlPO" system sells to
bidders, or the highest bidders, of the shares requested, but at the
price of the lowest bid accepted. 3 The "openlPO" system protects
the issuer against under-pricing, and also protects the highest
bidder against the "winner's curse."' That curse, common to
straight Dutch auctions, affects the highest bidder - he "is the one
most likely to have overvalued the auctioned asset," relative to
other participants in a competitive market. 5
Another flaw in Rule 2790 relates to a policy inherited, in part,
from the Interpretation." The proposed rule places no restrictions
on the issuer directing new issue placements to selected persons,
including friends and family, unless such person is an employee or
director of the issuer, its parent or its subsidiary.' However,
issuer-directed sales to broker dealers would continue to be
prohibited. '  The proposed rule would allow the issuer to
distribute IPOs on a pro rata, "equal opportunity" basis to at least
10,000 people, a disproportionate number of which cannot be
restricted persons. 9
The overall impact of the issuer-directed sales exemption is to
neatly align the interests of the issuer's management and directors
with those of the underwriter and its institutional clients. As
discussed above, a hot IPO means that the issuer has not raised as
much money as it otherwise could from the public offering, and the
rights of prior stakeholders have been diluted. However, the issuer
will not pressure the underwriter into conducting the offer at a
proper price, because the issuer's management and directors stand
462. Id.
463. See id. Any individual or institution bidding less than the lowest bid
would receive no shares. Id.
464. Id.
465. See id.
466. See Hensley & Endres, supra note 433.
467. See Rule 2790 Amendment No.2, supra note 438, at 76,318.
46& See id.
469. Id. at 76,317.
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to personally profit from a hot IPO.
Despite its shortcomings, Rule 2790 includes certain changes
that liberalize the rule's enforcement without jeopardizing its
effectiveness. For example, the proposed rule will only be
applicable to equity offerings.47 The rule will not apply to
convertible securities; exempted securities (as defined in §3(a)(12)
of the Exchange Act); preferred securities; investment grade asset-
backed securities (as defined in SEC Form S-3); closed-end
investment company securities (as defined under §5(a)(2) of the
Investment Company Act); and "rights, offerings, exchange offers,
and offerings made pursuant to a merger or acquisition." 7 '
Additionally, the proposed rule exempts all debt securities
from new issue restrictions, regardless of their investment grade, as
well as secondary offerings of actively traded securities.72 The
latter types of offerings are difficult to purposely under-price, due
to the market impact. Similarly, existing market prices already
provide a clear and definite pricing benchmark for actively traded
securities. Debt securities are tied primarily to interest rates, and
thus are not influenced by market demand. They also attract very
little retail interest.
Finally, some aspects of Rule 2790 reflect compromises with
everyday business practicality. In particular, Rule 2790 eases
restrictions on under-subscribed issues.73  Because Rule 2790
covers new issues and not just hot (i.e., oversubscribed) issues, it
expressly provides that an underwriter, pursuant to an
underwriting agreement, may place a portion of the offering on its
own accounts when it is unable to sell that portion to the public.7'
470. Hensley & Endres, supra note 433.
471. Rule 2790 Amendment No. 2, supra note 438, at 76,318.
472. See Rule 2790 Amendment No. 1, supra note 436, at 2659; Rule 2790
Amendment No. 2, supra note 438, at 76,318 (discussing of the rationales for the
exemptions in question). Historically, the NASD has exempted most, but not all,
investment grade asset backed securities from hot issue restrictions. See NASD
Rule on Trading in Hot Equity Offerings, supra note 435.
473. See Hensley & Endres, supra note 433. Rule 2790 would allow an
underwriter to place shares of an under subscribed IPO in their account when it
is unable to sell that portion to the public. Id.
474. See Rule 2790 Amendment No. 2, supra note 438, at 76,318.
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C. IPO Allocations Secured through Kickbacks
Under current IPO allocation rules, the underwriter's
discretion in distributing IPOs remains virtually unrestricted.
However, IPO allocations secured through kickbacks to the
underwriter in the form of increased trading revenues or outsized
commissions are particularly shocking to the SEC.75 Although the
problem is not specifically addressed by any particular statute or
regulation, there are several liability theories that may apply, some
of them derived from criminal law.
1. Liability for Mail and Wire Fraud
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1346 a "scheme or artifice to deprive
another of the intangible right of honest services" is a "scheme to
defraud" within the meaning of the federal mail and wire fraud
statutes. 476 Moreover, a scheme to deprive another of intangible
services could potentially trigger liability under the Racketeering
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") because mail
and wire fraud is a predicate offense under that statute.4 7' A RICO
violation is punishable by up to twenty years in prison or by stiff
fines including confiscation of the assets of the business or
company involved, or by both.478
A conviction for mail and wire fraud over a deprivation of
475. See generally, Coffee, The IPO Allocation Probe: Who Is the Victim?,
supra note 14, at 5.
476. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000). The federal mail and wire statutes may be found
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 et seq. (2000).
477. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-63 (2000). See generally, Lisa Pritchard Bailey et
al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1035
(1999). Although the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO") was designed to combat organized crime, it has broad applications
because Congress mandated that RICO "be liberally construed to effectuate its
remedial purpose." Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, §
904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947; see also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587
(1981) (holding that enactment by Congress of an intentionally broad RICO
statute supersedes courts' authority to restrict its application). Accordingly,
legitimate businesses may be the target of RICO liability. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499-500 (1985).
478. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (2000).
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honest services requires that the government prove the existence of
a duty to provide such honest services.79 Generally, a duty to
provide honest services would exist in a fiduciary relationship.80
An underwriter could raise at least two defenses against a
charge brought under 18 U.S.C. §1346.4 ' First, it could argue that
its relationship with a corporation represented by a sophisticated
securities counsel cannot be characterized as fiduciary. 2 Secondly,
it could also argue that establishing the price of securities during a
public offering involves arms-length bargaining that is outside of
the scope of fiduciary duties.83
In some jurisdictions, courts have explicitly described the
relationship between an underwriter and an issuer as being such
that fiduciary obligations may arise under some circumstances. '
In In re Daisy Systems Corp., the Court ruled that Bear Steams &
Co. owed a duty to its underwriting client, Daisy Systems.85
According to the Ninth Circuit, even though Daisy Systems was a
sophisticated corporate client, it was "unschooled in the niceties of
public acquisitions.' '86 Hence, whether the requisite "superiority"
implicit in a fiduciary duty could have existed was a question for a
jury to decide.'
In the Second Circuit case of United States v. Chestman, it was
held that "[a] fiduciary relationship involves discretionary
authority and dependency."88 In the absence of discretionary
authority and dependency, influence may suffice.89  The
relationship between an underwriter and an issuer can easily meet
this relatively low threshold for the existence of a fiduciary duty.
479. See United States v. Gray, 790 F.2d 1290, 1296 (6th Cir. 1986).
480. Id.
481. Coffee, The IPO Allocation Probe: Who Is the Victim?, supra note 14, at 6
("At least two defenses exist to [the] 'intangible rights' theory.").
482. Id.
483. Id.
484. See id. (stating that "authority exists that an investment banking firm can
owe a fiduciary duty to a sophisticated public corporation ....
485. In re Daisy Sys. Corp., 97 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 1996).
486. Id. at 1178
487. See id.
488. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 569 (2d Cir. 1991).
489. See id.
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This would particularly be the case if the underwriter induced the
issuer's executives to award themselves hot IPOs. On the other
hand, the underwriter could argue that even if dependency,
influence, and discretionary authority existed with respect to
certain aspects of the relationship, they did not exist as far as
pricing decisions were concerned."9 As with Daisy Systems, the
Chestman standards for a fiduciary relationship require a fact-
specific analysis by the jury.
2. Rule 10b-5
The government could also address hot IPO abuses by
assessing liability under Rule 10b-5."'" For example, the
government could allege that the underwriter failed to disclose its
true underwriting compensation in the prospectus. ' According to
the SEC, undisclosed mark-ups over 10% are presumptively
fraudulent."3 In essence, the government would argue that the
undisclosed brokerage commissions represented illegal
"kickbacks." 9' Unfortunately, the cases targeted by the SEC for
excessive mark-ups typically involve "widows and orphans," not
sophisticated and well-advised corporations. '95
Another problem with utilizing the Rule 10b-5 theory is that
the institutional investor paying the excessive commissions is
490. See Coffee, The IPO Allocation Probe: Who Is the Victim?, supra note
14, at 6 (arguing that "even if the underwriter is a fiduciary to the issuer.., the
issuer client may either understand that pricing is outside that relationship as an
inherently arms-length negotiation, or may consent, possibly implicitly, to
underpricing as a means of hyping the stock price.").
491. See id.
492. See id.
493. In re BC Fin. Corp., 57 S.E.C. Docket 103 (June 30, 1994); Charles
Michael West, 47 S.E.C. 39, 42 n.12 (1979); Adams Sec., Inc., 47 S.E.C. Docket
2379, 2384 (Mar. 9, 1993); Powell & Assocs, Inc. 47 SEC 746, 748 (1982).
494. See Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943).
495. See, e.g., id. at 436 (involving "single women and widows"); see also SEC
v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450 (2d Cir. 1996) (involving "hundreds of
thousands" of retail customers). See generally, Allen D. Madison, Derivatives
Regulation in the Context of the Shingle Theory, 2 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 272
(1999).
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probably doing so voluntarily. '96 A complicating factor involves the
"indirect" character of the quid pro quo potentially involved.4"
The underwriter may allocate hot IPOs to a valued client to
preserve goodwill. 98 Correspondingly, the institutional client may
engage in excessive trading, with the implicit assumption that the
resulting good relations with the underwriter will increase the
likelihood of generous allocations of hot IPOs in the future. '99 The
absence of a specific regulatory ban by either the NASD or the
SEC against favoritism in IPO allocations makes a criminal case
against the industry an uphill, although not impossible, battle.'
VI. HOT IPOs & THE MUTUAL FUND MANAGER
A. Section 17 of the Investment Company Act
As previously discussed, it is a violation of the NASD's Free-
Riding and Withholding Interpretation for the underwriter to
allocate hot IPOs to a manager of an investment company.
However, under Section 17 of the Investment Company Act of
1940, the manager is also barred from "accepting" the hot IPO.5 '
496. See Coffee, The IPO Allocation Probe: Who Is the Victim?, supra note 14,
at 6 (acknowledging that "this theory is harder to maintain when the client is a
sophisticated hedge fund that may have offered to pay such a fee with its eyes
wide open.").-
497. See id.
49& Id. (speaking of the "possibility that the hedge fund paid the excess
brokerage rate not for a specific transaction, but to earn the underwriter's
general good will and obtain eventual allocations in multiple transactions. In
contrast, a bribe usually involves a specific quid pro quo exchange.").
499. See id.
500. See id.
501. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (2000). According to SEC Commissioner Robert
Healey's testimony during the Investment Company Act enactment hearings,
Section 17 says that "you cannot sit on both sides of the table when you are
dealing with an investment trust." Investment Company Act of 1940; Hearings on
S. 3580, Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking & Currency,
76th Cong., 37 (1940) [hereinafter, Commissioner Healey's Testimony].
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The purpose of Section 17(d) of the Investment Company Act
is to prevent insider abuse."°u
The transactions covered under Section 17(d) and its surrogate
Rule 17(d)-i involve any joint arrangement in which an affiliate 3
of an investment company and the investment company sit on the
same side of the table during a business transaction."
Commissioner Healey illustrated the type of abuse that Section
17(d) was designed to address -
Investment companies have been compelled to finance banking
clients of the insiders, and companies in which they were
personally interested. Some investment companies are
organized to be operated essentially as discretionary brokerage
accounts, with the insiders obtaining the brokerage
commissions. In many instances the abuses are more subtle but
just as injurious to the investor. The public's funds are used to
502 See Joseph W. Bartlett & Stephen P. Dowd, Section 17 of the Investment
Company Act - An Example of Regulation by Exemption, 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 449,
449 (1984).
503. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3) (2000) of the Investment Company Act defines an
affiliated person as follows -
"Affiliated person" of another person means (A) any person directly or
indirectly owning, controlling, or holding with power to vote, 5 per centum or
more of the outstanding voting securities of such other person; (B) any person 5
per centum or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or
indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, by such other person;
(C) any person directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under
common control with, such other person; (D) any officer, director, partner,
copartner, or employee of such other person; (E) if such other person is an
investment company, any investment adviser thereof or any member of an
advisory board thereof; and (F) if such other person is an unincorporated
investment company not having a board of directors, the depositor thereof.
Id.
504. See Bartlett & Dowd, supra note 502, at 450-53. By contrast, earlier
sections are more specific. For example, Section 17(a) is applicable only to sales,
purchases, or loans conducted directly between an investment company and its
affiliate, as parties sitting on the opposite sides of the table. The loose contours
of Section 17(d) presumably reflect an intent to address those activities not
described in the earlier subsections. Consider the full text of 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
17(a) (2000).
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further the banking business of the insiders to obtain control of
various industrial enterprises, banks and insurance companies,
so that the emoluments of this control will flow to these
controlling persons.5O5
Notably, Section 17(d) does not make any specific conduct
unlawful.' Rather, rules subsequently promulgated by the SEC
determine what types of conduct constitute a violation.
The strength of Section 17(d) is Rule 17d-l. Rule 17d-l(a)
prohibits any joint arrangements or enterprises between
investment companies and affiliated persons absent prior SEC
authorization.' Rule 17d-l(a) outlines regulation by exemption,
wherein the absence of an exemption entails an absolute ban on a
relevant activity.' However, none of the Rule 17d-1 exemptions is
applicable to the hot IPO phenomenon. 1 Therefore, whenever an
affiliate and an investment company sit on the same side of the
table and conduct a business transaction with a third party,
approval must be secured in advance from the SEC or the
transaction is disallowed."'
In the following case, although the SEC chose not to pursue a
violation of Rule 17d-1 (alleging instead breaches of a number of
other rules and statutory provisions), a breach of Rule 17d-1 would
have provided a solid basis for an enforcement action.
505. Commissioner Healey's Testimony, supra note 501.
506. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(d) (2000).
507. Adoption of Rule N-17-D1 Requiring Applications in Respect of Joint
Enterprises or Arrangements and Certain Profit-Sharing Plans Pursuant to
Section 17(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, Investment Company Act
Release No. IC-2472, 1957 SEC Lexis 906 (Jan. 10, 1957).
50& See Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner Kraakman, Investment Companies as
Guardian Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC in the Corporate Governance
Debate, 45 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1,001 (1993).
509. See Bartlett & Dowd, supra note 502, at 452-53.
510. See generally, Applications Regarding Joint Enterprises or Arrangements
and Certain Profit-Sharing Plans, 17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-1 (2001).
511. See Bartlett & Dowd, supra note 502, at 452-53.
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B. In re Monetta Financial Services, Inc.
In re Monetta Financial Services, Inc. 12 involved a "hot issue"
allocation scheme - the mutual fund would increase its brokerage
activity with the underwriters, in exchange for two Monetta mutual
funds directors' personal receipt of hot offerings."' The directors
quickly flipped the hot issues, earning tens of thousands of dollars
in profits. 4 The directors had not disclosed the allocation to the
funds' shareholders.5 They had also failed to obtain the consent
of disinterested representatives of the funds for the transaction. 6
In other words, the fund and its affiliates had entered into a profit-
sharing enterprise without seeking prior SEC approval.
The SEC focused on the directors' failure to disclose the
transaction. 17  Because the IPO allocations "created serious
conflicts of interest for [the directors] in their review of the funds'
operations, the allocations constituted material information that
was relevant to the operation of the [f]unds." '5 8 The Commission
therefore alleged violations of §17(a) of the Securities Act, as well
as §10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 19
VII. CONCLUSION
The current statutory and regulatory framework is inadequate
to address the hot IPO phenomenon or to prevent its possible
recurrence. The SEC should invoke its rulemaking powers to
strengthen disclosures of analyst conflicts of interest and potential
bias. Moreover, IPO allocation rules should be redrafted to
prevent favoritism. In particular, restrictions should be placed on
allocations to institutional investors and issuer-directed persons.
512- In re Monetta Fin. Serv., Inc., Securities Act Release No. 7510, 1998 SEC
LEXIS 329 (Feb. 26, 1998).
513. Id. at *9.
514. Id. at *10.
515. Id. at *11.
516. Id.
517. See id.
518. Id. at *12-*13.
519. See id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2000), also known as §17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933.
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This would deter underwriters from purposefully under-pricing
IPOs with the implicit consent of the issuer's management or
directors. In addition, such regulatory changes would also increase
the efficiency of capital markets. Finally, underwriters should be
required to distribute IPOs on either a pro rata or Dutch auction
basis; this could be accomplished either by SEC action or internal
NASD requirements.
